

887A88

POLITICAL ACTIVISM OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
IN HONG KONG

by

SING MING

MASTER THESIS

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements of the Degree of
Master of Philosophy (SOCIOLOGY)

THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

June 1987

thesis
2A
1134
H6556

484539



Abstract

Faced with a number of favourable factors for political activism of university students in the 80's of Hong Kong, we were bewildered with an extremely low level of political activism among our students. Thus, in-depth interviews were employed to tap the answers for probing our enigma from 30 students of present activists, nonactivists and past activists.

The study began with exploring students' orientations of political efficacy, political trust & civic obligation. Besides, noting the significant impacts of historical contexts on students' activism, a historical-comparative approach was adopted whereby the social, political, economic and cultural environments across 3 epochs of student activism were highlighted to enlighten us on the problem. Lastly, the mobilization potential of the activist' organization in campuses was also assessed, considering the importance of the mobilized political participation in today's campuses.

The nonactivists' inefficacy, political trust of Government's policy outputs, and instrumental individualism, have jointly produced their inactivistic spectator role in political affairs. The activists' passionate concern of

self-determinations, instrumental collectivism and individual's sense of duty of social concern, have shaped their activistic participatory role in political affairs.

The environments along different historical contexts were found to affect our student's activism through the students' orientations and mobilization potential of student organizations. Finally, the marginal, contradictory and the ideal-lacking nature of Hong Kong society are reflected.

Acknowledgements

Writing this most arduous academic work in my life to-date is both a painstaking and unforgettable job. It is unforgettable as I have been led to step on the gateway of viewing social milieu through a productive historical-comparative perspective. Sincere thanks must, therefore, be extended to my teacher, Dr. S.K. Lau, who constantly imbues me with the perspective.

Heartfelt thanks must be extended to Leung Sai Hin and Kwan Chung Yuen, who have always been my most faithful helpers, in times when I need some unconditional help! Thanks must also be made for all interviewees and other discussants who have turned this research work into a possibility.

CONTENT

Chapter One	Introduction: Approach and Method	p.1
Chapter Two	Nonactivists' Political Attitudes	p.27
Chapter Three	Present Activists' Political Attitudes	p.60
Chapter Four	Historical and Environmental Map of Student Activism	p.91
Chapter Five	Activists' Political Mobilization	p.127
Chapter Six	Student Activism -- A Reflection of Hong Kong Society	p.134
Appendix		p.156
Bibliography		p.158

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: APPROACH & METHOD

'Emigration surge as confidence falls.... More professionals and executives are now seeking homes overseas after a relatively quiet 1984-85 emigration period.'

May 12, 1987, South China Morning Post, H.K.

I. Crisis And Enigma

Ever since the signing of the historic Sino-British Agreement in 1984 that promulgates the reverting of Hong Kong's sovereignty from Britain to China 10 years later - the menace of 1997 looms large in the minds of Hong Kong people. Despite Hong Kong's bearing an anachronistic and humiliating label of 'colony' and that the changing hands of sovereignty entails the returning 'home' of more than 500 million Hong Kong Chinese from the British 'colonial' rule to China's governance, Hong Kong people seems to have been frustrated, worried and even frightened with that specific arrangement. (Emmos, 1985:53-74) Can this

tiny island, portrayed by Milton Friedman as an economic paradise, maintain her robust and admirable economy before and after 1997? Can the existing large scope of freedom widely enjoyed by people, and well entrenched under British democratic tradition, remains intact after the claiming of our sovereignty by a socialist country? Can the widely acclaimed political stability that Hong Kong has enjoyed for so long be preserved in the midst of polemic political reforms in both Hong Kong and China? And, above all, can the high level of political autonomy promised under the rubric of 'One Country, Two Systems' be eventually realized in future? Those are the uncertainties so important to people's lives that they repeatedly surface and haunt their minds. While the variegated reactions of people run from passive and fatalistic acquiescence to active political participation, and from continuous settlement in Hong Kong to emigration, what we need urgently are people who are vigilant of our social and political scenes and committed to safeguarding the interests of Hong Kong.

Among those people, the 'strategic' importance of the well-educated stratum is particularly noteworthy. In fact, the stabilizing and the 'backbone' function of the well-educated 'middle-class', has spanned through

seminal works in politics and sociology from Aristotle to Daneil Bell. In Aristotle's thought-provoking The Politics (1981), middle-class was depicted as a stratum of well-educated people intelligent enough to moderate between the upper class and the lower class. While in Bell's model of Post-industrial society. (Bell, 1973; 1968, p.61-101), the knowledge-creators and the techno-bureaucrats are regarded to play a pivotal role in shaping the course of our societies. In a nutshell, the 'exodus' of professionals, executives or other techno-bureaucrats from Hong Kong probably forebode an ominous sign for Hong Kong's future. It not only indicates the 'confidence gap' between what is promised and what is believed, but the escalating departures of the well-educated from Hong Kong will surely devitalize, if not kill this very golden goose to lay golden eggs!

At this juncture, 2 critical questions emerge: Where does the well-educated stratum come from? Will the new 'batch' of the well-educated wake up to our political reality, take up the challenge and be more politically conscious and participatory to assert for our rights and interests? Answering the first question, the two local universities undoubtedly serve as a key fountain of the well-educated elites for Hong Kong. Thus, if we

want to figure out the second question, we should shed our spot-light on the university students currently studying - the quasi-elites of our city-state. Based on the massive information from university student newspapers, magazines, commentaries (Chan, 1983:187-203; Cheng^u_A, 1987:32-34) and empirical research of university students' political activism, (HKU 1984, 1986) University students seemed to be both psychologically and behaviorally less involved with politics than those of the 70's. Mass apathy towards politics seems to be a common trait, which has been partially corroborated by the above empirical researches. Thus, it is an intellectual challenge to highlight the factors that can explain university students' existing political inactivism - the psychological and behavioral non-involvement in politics. The puzzle becomes more intriguing if we consider the following theoretical and empirical grounds:

1. Education has for long been repeatedly confirmed to be positively associated with psychological and behavioral involvement with politics. (Almond & Verba, 1966; Hughes, 1975; Huntington & Nelson, 1977; Milbrath 1977; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978;) Hence, it is reasonable to expect university students in Hong Kong,

the relatively more educated ones, to have noticeable psychological and behavioral involvement in politics. In addition, as the university students are presumably politically more informed ones, they are also accordingly figured to be more concerned and vocal about the political upheavals ensuing from the Hong Kong's future on individualistic or altruistic grounds.

2. The huge wave of students movements bombarding different parts of the world during the 60's and the early 70's (Sampson, 1970: 2; Lipset, 1969 and 1972, Almond & Powell, 1978) has provoked a theoretical postulation about the structural characteristic of the university student - Yang (1973: 49) asserted there exist such common denominators as physiological and sociocultural attributes among the post-secondary students that they are likely to engage in vigorous social and political actions: (Yang, 1973:49)

a. Social and physiological marginality

Socially, students are neither completely dependent on nor entirely independent of their parents for income, status, security and protection. Though they may be mature biologically and adults legally, they are not treated as adults and denied the rights attached to that status. Hence, they often become indeterminate,

restless and reckless. The social marginality and maturational transitoriness, in short, function as building blocks for their activism. (Yang, 73: 49-50)

b. Social Availability

Post-secondary school students usually possess more free hours and greater flexibility in spending their time when compared with those working adolescents and adults. Again, this trait conduces to students' activism.

c. Idealistic Orientation

Because of their, firstly, freedom from vested interests, secondly, nurture under a relatively critical and idealistic intelligentsia (Lipset, 1972), and, thirdly, commanding ideas by totalistic logic and utopian conviction rather than by cognitive understanding or real experience, post-secondary students are prone to idealism. When disillusioned with the reality, students' activism or movements seem to be the corollary.

3. With the heightened role of the Hong Kong Government in providing social services since the 70's, more complaints and frustration with her policy outputs might occur. (Lau 1983) So, students would be expected to be politically activist under their roles of

social vanguard for justice.

4. In 1970-76, the highest ebb of student activism occurred. (Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1983) Yet, that period is 'similar' to today's scenes in their sharing the the following characteristics. First, Hong Kong at both stages abound with severe social issues and conflicts. For instance, corruption and inferior status of Chinese language in the past paralleled with the present controversies over the establishment of Central Provident Fund and the direction of the political reform. Second, again, during both stages, China establish certain connection with Hong Kong and exerts appreciable effects on the colony. For instance, the 'Ping-pong diplomatic strategy' and the arranged tours for Hong Kong university students in the early 70's promoted the image in the eyes of university students. For the present moment, the predominant influences China exerts on Hong Kong has made the latter caricatured as a lame-duck.

Considering the aforementioned favourable factors for student activism, we have to address to ourselves the question of what has led to the large discrepancy in political activism between 2 periods?

Summing up this part, based on the 4 just mentioned theoretical and empirical considerations, we are presented with an intellectual enigma that needs to be disentangled:

What are the causes for the present relatively low level of political activism in Hong Kong?

II. Research Problem

With the above background information about Hong Kong's scenario and local student activism, I would like to delineate the essentials of this research paper as follows:

Research Problem: The Political Activism of university Students in Hong Kong.

Unit of Analysis: The University students who either studied or are studying in the two universities of Hong Kong.

Significance: 1. Theoretical:

Trying to unravel the underlying causes for the prevalent syndrome of political inactivism, we hope to shed light on the intellectual enigma

2. Practical:

Based on the premise that the political involvement of the students reflects in part their commitment or concern over Hong Kong, this research enables us to project the future commitment of the potential elites to Hong Kong. No doubt, the commitment of the elites will have strong impacts on our social development.

Last but not the least, since both activists and nonactivists, in the past (70's) and the present (80's) will be closely examined during the research, this very historical-comparative approach might enlighten us on the unique features of the Hong Kong society.

III. Conceptualization & Literature Review

Conceptually speaking, political activism refers to the degree of active involvement in politics. Put in more rigorous terms, it is a composite index of two

concepts, namely, psychological involvement in politics
(attitudinal dimension) and political participation
(behavioral dimension).

Psychological involvement denotes the degree that
citizens are interested and concerned about politics.
(Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978:71) More specifically,
it taps the people's interest in politics, extent
of engaging in political discussions, political
information and knowledge, as well as extent of being
able to articulate community and 'national'
(Colony-wide) issues. (Verba and Nie, 1972:367-375,
Appendix)

'Just as psychological involvement is a central
variable determining exposure to political stimuli, so
it is a central attitudinal variable relating to
participation in politics'. (Milbrath and Goel, 1977:46)
In fact, more than a dozen studies spreading over
different cultures have demonstrated that people who
are more psychologically involved in politics are more
likely to be activists. (Barelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee,
1954; Campbell, etc., 1960; Mathews & Prothro, 1966;
Inkeles, 1969; Verba and Nie, 1972; Nie, Powell &
Prewitt, 1969)

Regarding 'political participation', i.e. the
behavioral dimension of political activism, a seminal
work on that topic defined it as 'activity by private


citizens designed to influence government decisions-making.' (Huntington and Nelson, 1976:3) Participation may be individualized or collective, organized or spontaneous, sporadic or sustained, peaceful or violent, legal or illegal, effective or ineffective.' (Huntington & Nelson, 1976:3) The usual modes of political participation consist of voting, campaign activity, cooperative (organizational) activity and personal contacting. (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978: 51-54) Nevertheless, owing to the close affinity between Hong Kong and China, and that international affairs time after time provoked students' participation, thus the 'government' as defined in 'political participation' is not confined to the Hong Kong Government, but Chinese and other countries as well. So far, we have given a conceptual clarification of our dependent variable, the political activism. Next, we shall review the literature which were deemed important in explaining our dependent variable.

Since, it is the political activism of the university students we are studying , 2 types of literature needs to be reviewed:

1. A general review of the factors affecting political activism.
2. A more refined particular review of the significant causes for student activism.

A. General review

According to a most thoroughly documented work in political participation (Milbrath and Goel, 1977:33), environmental, life position and personal factors form the most significant types of variables in explaining political participation. To elaborate, the environmental factors refer to the social, political, economic and cultural settings in the 'larger' environment as well as the contextual elements embedded in the immediate environment. Life position factors comprise education, age, sex, income and race that probably influence our socialization experiences. Finally, the personal factors are composed of a multitude of political attitudes, beliefs and personality traits. A simplified diagram depicting the causal interrelationship among the types of variables is drawn as follows: (Milbrath & Goel, 1977:33)



As far as this research is concerned, life position factors of students will not be discussed so that we can concentrate on the exploration of other parts.

B. Particular Review on Student Activism

The pictures on the causes of student participation or student movement are even more dazzling.

To avoid overly complicating the situations, 2 seminal works on student activism are presented here.

First, in accordance with Keniston's view (in Sampon, p.168) At least four factors seem involved in any one protest:

1. Personal backgrounds, values and motivations; 2. A suitable educational and social setting; 3. A special cultural climate; 4. A conducive historical situation.

Second, based on a comparative study of student activism of 11 countries across 6 continents, (Klineberg, Zavalloni, Louis-Guerin, BenBrika, 1979: 3-16), 4 usual perspectives on student activism are summarized here:

i. The Psychological Portrait of the Protester

By concentrating on the "social actor" in the

movement, the family backgrounds, personality traits and political attitudes of the activists are compared to nonactivist control groups. In the U.S., the activists were found to come from relatively comfortable socioeconomic backgrounds, with intimate relationship with their highly educated parents; they had also a strong orientation to refuse conventionally institutionalized roles. Yet, for such countries as France, Austria and Italy, where a long Socialist and Communist tradition with a strong working base was well established, leftist students had a less privileged background (Lipset, 1968)

ii. The Generation Conflict

Owing to the rapid changes in urbanization, communication, living conditions, scientific development and other dimensions of modernization, a divergence and conflict between youth values and the dominant values of the society - more specifically, those of students' parents, triggering off student movements oriented to social changes.

iii. Protest as a New Political Force

" In contrast to official Marxism, which considers the students as a force auxilliary to the revolutionary movement of the workers, Marcuse (1964, 1968, 1969)

thinks that in a modern industrial country the students represent a major force of protest." (Klineberg etc. 1979: 10) They were taken as a new class of avant-gardes against the social, racial and economic injustice. Sometimes, the youthful disaffiliation with their societies went beyond a political movement to a cultural movement - establish a counterculture seeking to transform the deepest sense of the self, the others and the environment. (Roszak, 1969)

iv. The Marxist Protest

In some European Countries, especially in France, Italy, and Germany, the students borrowed their credo from Marxism-Leninism, Trotskyism or Maoism. They perceived themselves as the fighters for the poor workers against bourgeois oppression.

To generalize the literature we have so far reviewed, the following important threads running through them are extracted to constitute the framework of this thesis:

1. Actors' orientation

To understand why activists have high political activism and non-activists the otherwise, one direct and useful way, as implied by the literature, is to probe their orientations and, in turn their 'understanding' of the situations. Out of the dozens of political orientations deemed important for political activism, (Goel & Milbrath, 1977) 3 mostly documented and significant attitudes, the civic obligation, political efficacy and political trust were extracted for our study, which are taken as the proximate causes for the political activism:

a. Civic Obligation

By common sense, when a person feels he ought to learn about politics and participate in politics as an obligation, his political activism will be elevated. In other words, we shall probe the sense of civic obligation to participate among our respondents. In fact, ample studies have shown that people feeling a duty to participate in politics are more likely to do so. (Campbell, Gurin & Miller, 1954; Campbell, etc, 1960; Milbrath, 1968; Alford & Scoble, 1968; Dennis, 1970)

b. Political Efficacy

If a person believes that political attentiveness and active political participation brings no change to the political system at all, we would expect his political activism to be dampened by that kind of belief.

Over and again, it has been found that there exists a positive association between political efficacy and political participation from researches across different places and times. (Almond & Verba, 1963; Campbell, etc, 1960; Dahl, 1961; Huntington & Nelson, 1977; Lane, 1959; Matthews & Prothro, 1966; Milbrath, 1971; Verba and Nie, 1972, 1978; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978) Considering the low level of political participation on the part of the university students , a low level of political efficacy is predicted.

In fact, 'The feeling of political efficacy is one of the most widely discussed concepts in political science' (Milbrath & Goel, 1977:57) Conceptually defined, political efficacy is the feeling that one is capable of influencing the public decision-making process. The question in Verba and Almond's Civic Culture that measures the respondents' belief of having capacity to influence politics, i.e. subjective competence will be adopted. (Watts, 1973:628, appendix)

c. Political Trust

Political trust refers to the general expectations people have about the quality of the product that the political system produces. (Gamson in Abecarian & Soule, 1971:41) The objects of trust are focused on political leadership and policies (Gamson in Abecarian & Soule, 1971:42)

So far, psychological involvement in politics has not been deeply discussed. In fact, psychological involvement in politics and political participation are closely related. (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978:71) Also, civic obligation, political efficacy as well as trust represent the desirability, feasibility and necessity of engaging in political arena. Thus, we would expect the three personal attitudes to be positively associated with psychological involvement in politics as well. Also, the generalization about the socioeconomic basis of political activity were asserted to apply to the basis of psychological involvement in politics as well. (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978:71) Hence, tests will be conducted with psychological involvement accordingly.

2. Mobilization Potential of Student Organization


From time to time, it has been found that mobilized political participation is a major mode of student activism. Since student organization in campus have geographical advantage and institutionalized channels to communicate, persuade and mobilize university students directly, the mobilization potential of key student organizations will be focused on so as to assess its effects on students' political activism.

3. Social and Cultural Environment

As constantly repeated by the literature the social, economic, political and cultural environments exercise enormous effects on all variables we have discussed already. Thus, their nature and effects on student activism will be investigated along different historical contexts.

Through an approach of historical comparison, it is believed that the effects of different combinations of environments during different historical epochs can be highlighted.

The final framework of our thesis, after putting the 3 blocks together in diagram becomes:



IV. Approach

Under the paucity of rigorous research on Hong Kong's student activism of universities, in-depth interview is being justifiably employed so as to probe deeply into the problem. Since it is only an exploratory research, plus the limited number of the cases being studied, this thesis aims at being suggestive about student activism instead of producing any definitive generalizations. (For details, see Appendix II)

For testing our framework, we deliberately enlarge the variations in backgrounds of our respondents by interviewing 3 groups of university students:/

1. 10 Present Activists: They are university students currently studying with high level of political

activism. All have been leaders of 2 key student organizations - Student Union and Student Newspaper. (It is presumed that their leadership status reflects a high level of political activism - which is confirmed later.)

2. 13 Present Inactivists: Except 2 of them, the others were introduced to me by my friends. They were identified with the aid of my thorough description of the characteristics of non-activists to my friends.

3. 7 Past activists: They had all been student leaders, spanning from 1971 to 82.

The interviews started in March and ended in April. All except one of the 30 interviewees were interviewed indoors and tape-recorded with their prior permission. An average of 2.5 hrs. (with average of 1.8 to 4 hours) was recorded for the interviews. One round of interview was held for 27 of them. With delivery of promises to present students that their names will be changed in my thesis, it surely promotes the validity of what they say. For 3 of the present activists. 3 rounds of interviews were conducted for clarifying and soliciting important information. Semi-structured questionnaires with both open and

close-ended questions were raised. Maximum encouragement was given to the respondents to speak out, free-flow and interrupt me, so as to maximize the information input. Such encouragement hopefully can help us to discover new ideas and concepts absent in our framework to explain our research problem, particularly so in the context of the exploratory nature of this research.

Before conducting each interview, especially concerning the activists, relevant information on student newspapers, student magazines and books were thoroughly read through in order to streamline and perfect the entire process.

Before we formally declare the repertoires played by the interviewees open, their background information are presented below. The names of the present students are changed to honour my promise of anonymity.

Present Activists

Social Sciences

1. Wong Kai Chung: 4th year, major: Sociology, CUHK, male. (executive member of the Student Union (SU), New Asia College, 1983-84)

2. Lo Wai Man: graduate student, major: GPA, CUHK male.
Chairman of SU, New Asia College, 1984.
3. Lee Kin Ming: 4th year, major: Sociology, CUHK,
male. Executive member and Chief Editor of the
Student Newspapers, 1985-86.
4. To Yuen On: 4th year, major: Sociology, CUHK,
female. Executive member of Student Newspaper and
CUSU, 1985-86.
5. Lo Ming: 4th year, major: Economics, CUHK, male.
Chief Editor of the Student Newspaper, 1984.
6. Li Wai Man: 4th year, major: Sociology, CUHK, male.
Executive member of the SU, Chung Chi College, 1984.
7. Yip Yuen On: 3rd year, major: Political Sciences,
HKU, Executive member of the SU, HKU, 1986.

Arts

8. Chun Kin Man: 2nd year major: Chinese Language,
CUHK, male. Chairman of the CUSU, 1986.

Business Administration

9. Choi Fai: 3rd year, major, General Business
Management, CUHK, male. Chairman of the CUSU, 1987.
10. Lam Kai Chung: 3rd year, major: General Business
Management), CUHK, male. Editor of the student
newspaper, 1985-86.

Present Nonactivists

Arts

1. Chan Po Ting: 1st year, major: History, CUHK, male.
2. Tsuen Keung: 1st year, major: History, CUHK, female.
3. Mak Lai Lok, 1st year, major: History, CUHK, female.
4. Tang Fung Ping: 3rd year, major: English, CUHK,
female.

Sciences

5. Law Ying Man: 3rd year, major: Biochemistry, CUHK,
male.
6. Chiu Ti Shen: 1st year, major: Computer Science,
CUHK, male.

Social Sciences

7. Yu Yuei Kei: 2nd year, major: Social Work, CUHK,
female.
8. Ng Chung: 2nd year, major: Sociology, CUHK, female.

Business Administration

9. Ho Chiu Sum: 3rd year, major: Finance, CUHK, female.
10. So Chiu Ling: 3rd year, major: General Business
Management, CUHK, female.
11. Ma Shui: 4th year, major: General Business
Management, CUHK, male.
12. Lam Po Ting: 3rd year, major: Accounting, CUHK,
male.

13. Man Keung: 4th year, major: General Business Management, CUHK, male.

Past Activists

1. Chan Yuk Cheung: Executive Member of SU HKU 72, Chairman of SU HKU 73, Chairman of Hong Kong Federation of Students 74-75.
2. Tsang Shu Kei: Executive Member of SU HKU, 72-73.
3. Fung Hoi Lab: Editor of *(Undergrad)* HKU, 71. Executive member of SU HKU, 72. Secretary of Student Council 73.
4. Mak Hoi Wah: Chairman of SU HKU, 73.
5. Ma Kwok Ming: Vice-chairman of , 1977, CUHK.
6. Tam Shu Fan: Vice-chairman of SU CU 78. Chairman of SU CU, 79.
7. Chan Kin Man: Editor of Student Newspaper, 80. Executive member of SU CU, 81.

As only 1 present activist and 1 present nonactivist have their family income exceeded 10,000 monthly, class factor can be ignored here.

As students of the University of Hong Kong were going to take their examinations when the interviews were conducted, only one current student, an activist,

was successfully researched. The disproportionate university backgrounds of the interviewees probably imply that findings mirror predominantly the scenes of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. We will study the present nonactivists first, followed by the present activists, and the past activists last. So, from here let's set out our journey to peer through the inner psychology of our main actors and actresses.

CHAPTER TWO

Nonactivists' Political Attitudes

'I simply don't feel that politics has direct pertinence to me, and I don't care who is sitting in our Governor's House.'

(Miss Ng, 2nd year Sociology)

To keep in line with our framework, we will start our whole repertoire with the political orientations of the 13 nonactivists, in the order of political efficacy, political trust and finally, the civic obligation. To begin with, how do we know that the actors and actresses were really nonactivists?

I. Interest in Politics

To reiterate our definition, political inactivism is composed of low political interest (psychological involvement) and low degree of political participation (behavioral involvement). Following Verba & Nie's measuring indicators (1972:368-9), it is found that:

1. 3 out of the 13 interviewees only very scarcely discussed politics, be it local or foreign. All the rest never discussed at all;
2. Only 4 students sometimes read news magazines. Moreover, those 4 had no deliberate topic or interest in mind to guide their reading when they pick up magazines. All the rest did not even glance them over;
3. 3 of them watched TV news everyday. The others did it sporadically, and,
4. finally 6, i.e. about a half of them read newspapers everyday. Yet 5 out of those 6 only scanned through the headlines. The others on the average did that once in four days! In addition, none of those 6 regular readers also played an active role in the other 3 aforementioned activities.

Putting the above results together, it is beyond reasonable doubt this group of interviewees scored extremely lowly on the psychological dimension of political activism. Faced with this fact, a riddle that surfaces in our minds is: What made them so uninterested in politics?

In response to this question, the first actor said,

From above, regarding their low interest in politics, we see that it is the nature of politics at work. Politics, by its very nature, is abstract and complex (Rosenberg, 1951:5-15). It demands basic knowledge, familiarity with facts and patience for comprehension. Lacking those prerequisites, the students found following politics closely uninteresting, costly and even disgusting. Glossing over the headlines became nearly the most they could afford. Yet, the story has not ended, Politics seemed so remote from their own and specific interests that giving additional attention to it was cost-ineffective,

'News about politics seems at a great distance from my life.'

(Miss Yu, 2nd year Social Work)

'The politics doesn't affect me too much. It may have its influence on me, but not now; maybe twenty or thirty years later!'

(Yu, 1st year History)

So concrete and so occupied are students with their schooling, family, companionship and other 'visible' aspects of daily life that, social policies or political changes, with reverberations indirect and no

'The current affairs, the politics, the Basic Law they are so boring, complicated that how can I have interest in them!'

(Miss Yuen, 1st year History)

Her impatient tone with politics, were indeed strongly echoed by others:

'I don't take much interest in news about politics because it is too complicated for me to grasp. Take the Basic Law for example, there are so many committees, specialized terms and debates that I don't know what they are all about! I can't afford a heavy cost, something that I must pay, to trace through its development so as to keep abreast of it!'

(Miss So, 3rd year General Business Management)

'Why don't I have interest in politics? Well, my friends also have little interest too! Though I think I ought to know more about it, I have little basic knowledge about it. It is just too costly and involves too much sacrifice to start from zero now'

(Miss Tang, 3rd year English)

certainty of falling on their heads, having interest in politics turned to be an arduous job. It is too remote to command our respondents attention, who were faced with all sorts of concrete 'urgent' and engaging daily issues. They could thus found no imperative in paying close and constant attention to politics (Rosenberg, p.51:13). Some of them, whose cost-benefit mentality was prominent, rejected their interest and concern with politics outright on instrumental grounds.

'Being a Business Administration, I should be concerned with Heng Seng Index and Gold prices. Knowledge about our political scenes doesn't help much in promoting my career. Concern with politics should be the job of those social science majors, not us!'

(Lam, 3rd year Accounting)

Lastly, a crucial factor comes to the fore.

'Why on earth should I be interested in politics if we could do nothing to change it! Thousands of protesting signatures have been signed against building Daya Bay nuclear plant and the passing of the Public Order Ordinance that infringes press freedom but they were futile.

So, what's the point of getting concerned with it?'

Up to this stage, we recognize that besides the complexity, abstractness, remoteness of politics, and the 'heavy costs' involved in getting psychological involvement with it, political inefficacy also stood out as a prominent factor to explain student's political inactivism as far as their interest in politics is concerned. What follows will still be the story about political inefficacy in dampening another facet of political activism-the political participation.

II. Political Efficacy

'If the Hong Kong Government is considering a legislation that you think would be very detrimental to our society, how will you face the situation?' (I ask) Lam's response can be taken as typical for the nonactivists.

'Attitudinally, I would oppose it.' (But will you take actions to manifest your opposition?)

'If I am the only dissenter, I'll do nothing at all. I don't think that the Hong Kong

Government will change her mind because of my voice. A single person can hardly alter the Government's decisions, sometimes not even mass pressures!'

(Mr. Law, 4th year Biochemistry)

So, in their judgment , applying mass pressure is essential for successful political 'struggle'. Nevertheless, more than 70% of them stress that it is useless in trying to influence governmental decision, even with mass support.

'Many people and organizations have expressed their anger for the freedom-threatening legislation of Public Ordinance. We have also signed in the petition letters written by the Student Union. But the Government just go ahead with her plan. So participating in political actions is useless!'

(Miss So, 3rd year General Business Management)

Many of them also quoted another case in their answers. This time, another government was involved.

'We don't want the Daya Bay nuclear plant to be built so closely to Hong Kong. More than a

million have signed a protesting letter. Yet, the China's Government simply ignored them! So, it is unimportant whether I have signed the letter or not.'

(Miss Ng, 2nd yr. Sociology)

Unquestionably, the failures to change the decisions of the governments over two traumatic, widely-supported political issues, have undermined our respondents' political inefficacy. Yet, noting that the Daya-Bay issue occurred in Summer, 1986, while the campaign against Public Order Ordinance ended in failure in 1987, how were respondent's political efficacy before those two frustrating experiences? Many of them responded that the sense of inefficacy was not as high as that after the events. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to calculate exactly by what degree their inefficacy had risen after those nightmares, Ng's incisive recollection of her experiences sharply reflect the built-in nature of their entrenched political inefficacy.

'I think many of us(university students) would feel that politics is something very strange. When studying Economics & Public Affairs in secondary schools, only some factual, static,

partial and beautifying pictures were introduced about our government. They told us the names and functions of the Governmental Departments. They also told that our Government consults public opinions. We were not taught to comment evaluatively on politics. Few secondary students were encouraged to study the section of contemporary Chinese History. Teachers said that it was difficult to score high marks in that section in the School Certificate Examination. So, many secondary students don't even realize how Hong Kong was ceded and leased from China Anyway, I have seldom been encouraged to be concerned with politics since my childhood. Nor do my family members, friends and schoolmates care about it. I simply don't feel that politics has direct pertinence to me, and I don't care who is sitting in Governor's House!'

(Miss Ng, 2nd year Sociology)

If Ng's family members, friends and schoolmates are not anomalous deviants, our university students--the future leaders of our society--seemed to have been brought up in a politically apathetic and non-participant social context. With regard to this

point, further evidence needs to be amassed and tabled before more tenable conclusion can be drawn. Yet, some crystal clear inherent depoliticizing elements built in our educational institution have been revealed. They were not taught to evaluate, to criticize and, least of all, to participate in politics in secondary schools. A cognitive approach stressing the institutional aspects of our polity, that does nothing but distort the political reality, was presented to student (Tsang, 1985:4-5).

Though our political education has failed to arouse our potential elites' interest in politics, can we draw out some concrete consequences on their political behaviour? Again, Miss Ng's vivid answer soundly epitomize the others' responses:

'I seldom attended forums on political issues. But when I did, I was afraid to speak up. I fear that my innocence in politics would be mocked at. So, I mustn't speak....!'

Hence, firstly, their knowledge-inefficacy about politics posed a strong threat to their ego and inhibited acquiring political skills and new political knowledge through outspoken manner in political communication. She furthered that,

'I was morally outrageous with the passing of the Public Order Ordinance. Yet, I would only sign my name in a letter already containing a long list of protesting signatures. I feel secure in that way. I would be scared to become one of the few, noticeable leaders, marching on the street.'

Mr. Man even went beyond Ng.

'I didn't sign the protesting letter. My name counts only once, so it is of nearly no use I will not be an initiator of any protest because I am not skilful whether I am will justified to launch that type of collective action Street-running petition, marching are too radical. They disturb the peace of our society!'

In fact, only one of our 13 respondents have participated in political events other than the issue of Daya Bay & Public Order Ordinance. On the one hand, it confirms that the behavioral dimension of this groups also indicated a low level of political activism. On the other hand, waging political protests in open confrontations with an authority (the

government) was so alien and large a break from their socialization experiences that they got very uneasy with any mode of participatory acts except the most peaceful one, the signing of letters. Even more ego-threatening was the idea of autonomously becoming an initiator or a leader of a confrontational campaign. They felt themselves lacking skill, knowledge, and judicious judgment of political participation. Then inefficacy-complex finally justified their sitting behind the facade and opting the safest way by joining the most 'civilized' mobilized mode of political participation.

To sum up, the nonactivists were some politically unskilled, mobilized followers, likely to influence government's decision through the mildest mode of political participation, only when some blatant 'social injustice' arises. Against this background, their unanimous answers of saying 'No' out of 'inefficacy-complex' to the following question becomes expected: 'will you autonomously write letter to air your views on the Green paper of our future Representative Government?'

III. Political Trust

As discussed earlier, people's evaluation of the quality of the product that the political system produces may affect political participation (Gamson in Abcarian & Soule, 1971:41-45). If they have very positive evaluation of governments' performance, why should they bother with changing her decisions? Thus, our respondents' political trust of Hong Kong's public policies and leadership in government (Gamson in Abcarian & Soule, 1971:42) are tapped.

We first ask them about their views on the policies of education and housing. Throughout the dialogues over this section, our quasi-elites' extremely low level of cognition of the political sphere was fully exposed. For instance, when I raised to Yuen, who lived in privately owned flats,

(What do you feel about quality of the public housing services provided by the Government in the past 10 years?)

She said, 'Ah....maybe I am satisfied.'

(Why?) (pause for more than 10 seconds)

The Government has built many public residential units.'

(Miss Yuen, 1st year History)

Many others only went a small step beyond Yuen's.

'I am content with the housing policies. Many public estates and Home Ownership Buildings have been built by the Government. Their rent or price are also quite cheap.'

(Miss So, 3rd year General Business Management)

'Oh, our housing policy has created a miracle in the world. Many high-rising public estates have supplanted the squatter huts.'

(Miss Ng, 2nd year Sociology)

In a word, their low interest in politics has predisposed them to observe the most prominent features of a public policy, e.g., the quantity of policy outputs(blocks of buildings) rather than the policy making process. Of course, we can find exception, yet the exceptions so rare that only one of them went somewhat deeper:

'On the surface, our Government seems to have achieved a marvellous job. Yet, despite the construction of so many public estates and new towns, many people have to still wait and wait before they can move in. Besides, the Housing

Authority runs on a financially self-sufficient basis. Though lands are reserved by the Government for housing projects, the real expenditure she has spent on housing is much less than what many believed.'

(Miss Yu, 2nd year Social Work)

Judging from their 'impressionistic' standpoint, no wonder only two of them felt dissatisfied with Government's housing policy.

In switching to educational policy, their direct personal experiences enabled them to express more harboured feeling,

'Although the Government has shouldered much responsibility in educational services, education is plagued by some problems. For instance, the educational facilities provided for lower class, including the environment for studying, are less than satisfactory. Moreover, moral education seems crippled in schools.'

(Mr. Law, 4th year, Biochemistry).

'The tremendous examination pressures in Hong Kong have severely impaired our initiatives of learning. We were also seldom taught how to

live our life. Besides, Chinese language was not encouraged by the Government to be the chief medium of instruction.'

(Miss Ng, 2nd year, Sociology)

Finally, concerning their overall evaluation of the quality of public policies, I asked,

'Taking the aggregate effects of public policies together, do you agree that the Government has satisfactorily improved our standard of living in the past decade?'

As expected, growing up in age of spirally expanding budget on social welfare, (elaborated in Chapter 4) only one of our respondents gave a negative answer to the question.

Summing up this part, our respondents have generally favourable evaluations on policies that significantly affect their lives. Except the issues of Daya Bay and Public Order Ordinance, there simply seems no blatant injustice which is so urgent and so necessary for them to be politically activist so as to secure a modest standard of living. But how about their political trust of leaders?

A. Trust of Leaders

As what we expect, only the most impressionistic accounts were given in response to my question:

(Is Youde a good Governor of Hong Kong?)

'He has give me a good impression,'

(Why?)

'... I don't know why; intuitively, I like him.... At least, he is a suitable leader for Hong Kong to weather the crisis of 1997.'

(Miss Yuen, 1st year, History)

'He can be said to be a good Governor.

Newspapers said that he worked very hard and flew here and there for negotiations of Hong Kong's future.'

(Miss Tang, 3rd year, English)

Though the constant flights of Youde between Peking, London and Hong Kong has won him a positive image of being diligent and kind among 3/4 of our respondents, some students articulated their mistrust and 'conspiracy theory' about Youde.

'I agree that it was a painstaking task for him to fly around. Yet, he's just a pawn of the U.K.'

(Miss Yu, 2nd year, Social Work)

(In case Hong Kong's interest conflicts with that of the U.K.'s, on which side do you think he will stand?)

'He will care U.K.'s interest first. In fact, the U.K. has often exploited Hong Kong for her interest.'

For Miss Ng (2nd year, Sociology)

'Our Governor will only be loyal to the Queen in such interest conflict. A case in point was that he did not struggle for our interest in Daya Bay issue despite popular opposition. For the Electronic Road Pricing scheme, since we have already paid the U.K. a lump sum to purchase equipment, our Government was willing to axe ERP scheme.'

Actually, it should be noted that 12 out of our 13 nonactivists echoed the view that the Hong Kong Government in general and the Governor in particular

will sacrifice Hong Kong's interest for the U.K.'s in case of interest conflicts. So, in their views, Hong Kong was merely a pawn of the U.K., and our interest would only be upheld when it did not contravene the interests of the eclipsed Colonial Empire.

Finally, when their views on general performance of Governmental Department heads and Secretaries were solicited. Yu (2nd year, Social Work) reported,

'They have their meetings, policy-making process and debates behind closed doors. So it's hard to deliver comments. Sometimes, I had a feeling that they were serving Britain's interest under the guise of serving Hong Kong people.'

Our Government was in essence a secluded monocratic bureaucracy. It was 'secluded' from political and social force which might threaten to undermine its autonomy.' (Lau 1982:25) Such exclusion has unavoidably promoted the feelings of remoteness, indifference and even suspicion on the part of our respondents toward the Government. Of course, the aforementioned severe lack of interest in politics also contributed to students superficial, simplistic and impressionistic comments on senior civil servants.

'Only very vague impressions can be conceived by me about those top civil servants. I think their abilities are O.K.. But, of course, there are some exceptions. Mr. Scott is a remarkable example of poor leader.... Responsiveness? I don't think they are responsive enough. They don't take the public opinion into account when formulating public policies.'

(Miss So, 3rd year, General Business Management)

'Hadon-Cave was a good civic servant. For others, I don't have much to say'

(Miss Tang, 3rd year English)

'Oh, their abilities are for sure O.K. Judging from the harsh examinations they must pass for getting their job and the variegated exposures they underwent under the rotational service arrangement, those senior AOs are personnel of high calibre.... But, I don't think they have paid enough attention to public opinions.'

(Lam 3rd year Accounting)

in short, a group of vaguely impressed capable, irresponsive and unapproachable governmental leaders were the images in their minds.

To round about this section, the nonactivists' trust of the tangible public policies at large has measurably decreased the necessity of political activism. Yet, what are the effects of their ignorance and mistrust (over motivation) of our political leader on activism?

On recalling Miss Ng's incisive and typical self-reflections,

'I simply don't feel that politics has direct pertinence to me, and I don't care who is sitting in our Governor's House!'

(2nd year, Sociology)

Whoever are occupying the top echelons of our political ladders seem no concern to her (and probably to them!). Then, what are their genuine concerns, their 'success' and their dreams? To answer the two questions raised here, we must set our minds to the most important and the concluding part of the entire chapter --- Students' civic obligation.

IV. Civic Obligation

(Do university students have the duty to be concerned with society?)

Their answers have given us many revelations about their concerns, their defined 'successes' and their dreams.

'Whether we should contribute and concerned with society is a matter of personal choice. People have the right of freedom to choose for themselves. Only when they think they have duties, the devotion to care and work for the society can be counted as a duty!'

(Mr. Law, 3rd year Biochemistry)

'People have choices to decide as to whether they should do this or not. We can't say that they are wrong if they don't care about our society.'

(Miss Tang, 3rd year English)

"People have freedom to decide what is right. If all people do the same thing, we human beings become too homogen^e_ous.'

(Mr. Lam, 3rd year Accounting)

From above, we witness a group of students espousing not only the cardinal value of individuals' freedom, but also, on closer scrutiny, the principle of moral

relativism, or, in Lukes' concept, ethical individualism. (Lukes, 1973 :101) It is the individual, to be the supreme arbiter of moral values. No one else can judge for himself.

Surprisingly, as many as 8 out of our 13 present nonactivists respondents articulated their belief in ethical individualism. 3 out of the other five answered that their moral duty should be confined to knowing what was going on in society. Only 2 of the 13 respondents definitely replied that university students have the duty to contribute to society for what they have received from society.

'Without tax-payers' support, we can't enjoy the huge facilities. Thus, university students should pay back our society.'

Probable corollaries of their general subscribing to ethical individualism under the banner of 'freedom' are a weakened sense of moral imperative to be concerned with society, to be interested in politics, and to have political participation. Freedom has become their protective shield that releases them from the alleged duty of having awareness, interest and participation in politics. Yet, their version of 'freedom' did not extremely dictate that they were urged to do

anything they wanted.

'As long as our actions don't do any harm to others, they are O.K.. In fact every job contributes to society. Why must we stress that we should be concerned with society?' (Mr. Lam and Mr. Ma)

Thus, their 'baseline' of individual freedom seems to be avoidance of inflicting 'palpable' harm to others or society. Except that, they believed they had every right and justification to do whatever they want.

'Freedom was ... the absence of constraints on us'

(Miss Tse 1st year History)

Miss Tse, who uttered out the implicit negatively defined version of 'freedom', had made a suggestive move. Based on solely the negatively defined concept of freedom, no unequivocal end-state was positively highlighted. With that precept alone, they were led to nowhere! Yet, they did not live in a cultural, social and historical vacuum. The historic relics of Hong Kong as a refuge for the Chinese refugees, the rapid

industrialization and the capitalist nature of Hong Kong's economy, the escalating provision of social welfare, the proliferation of the culturally pluralistic mass media and the increasing tolerance as well as skills of a predominantly depolicizing polity, have joint together (elaborated later) to shape the direction and dreams our respondents headed for. So the problem left for us to grapple with here and now is: What was the guiding principle as embodied in their sense of self and sense of purpose? To tap those sense and, subsequently, the guiding principle, it is fruitful to start with their own interpretation of 'being successful'.

A. Success

(When you choose your job, how would you rank the following 5 items as criteria in making your choice? Interest, Money, Power, Social status and contribution to society)

'I would for sure opt for interest as the top consideration during my job-hunting. Secondly, it will be money.'

(Mr. Ma 4th year General Business Management)

(So, becoming a tycoon is very important for you?)

'No, but I must have enough money to relieve my anxiety over financial difficulty in meeting a modest standard of living.'

(Mr. Ma)

Unsurprisingly, 8 out of 13 placed individual's interest as top priority in choosing their job. What came next was money.

They stressed their desire of financial 'security' to meet a 'modest standard of living', instead of having an intransigent demand of becoming a millionaire. 'Contribution to society', the only high-sounding and collective-interest oriented criterion, was only chosen by 3 out of the respondents. In addition, they were only ranked the 2nd most important criterion. Thus, a preliminary, self-oriented guiding map for our respondents has emerged.

The color of the picture got more enriched after my question:

(You have got a magic stick that can fulfill whatever wish you may have. Now, with the magic stick, can you tell me what sort of ideal life you want to experience? What are the elements contained in your ideal life?)

'Good friends, good husband, a harmonious family and no less than \$7000 monthly income should be contained in my ideal life.'

(Miss Tse, 1st year History)

Though Miss Tse was one of the only two students who asserted university students' duty to be concerned with our society, no trace of 'society' or collectivistic goals could be spotted in her 'ideal life' at all.

Similarly,

'I want to have a swimming pool and big house to live. Besides, I want to continue to study, accompanied with some good friends!'

(Miss Yuen, 1st year History)

'A job that suits my interest and capability, a warm family and having some good friends are what I dream of'

(Mr. Law, 4th year Biochemistry)

Though Miss Yu presented a more romanticized scenario of her 'wonderland', an individual and familial orientation, as contrasted with collective-interest orientation, also ran through her picture:

'I would dream of living in Australia, rearing some sheep, playing guitar by a hearth of fire with my good friends and family!'

In short, neither anti-establishment (posture) nor ideological tones could be found in our presumably idealistic vanguards of society. Instead of collectivistic idealism, they were only imbued with individualistic (or at the best, familistic) pragmatism. Their individualistic orientation was most distinctly exemplified by their self-orientated and instrumental calculations in locating their own roles with political affairs.

'I won't be any initiator or leader of political protests..... No, it is not because I am afraid of taking the role, but rather I have to spend a lot of time, energy and so on for doing that job.'

(Miss Tang, 3rd year English)

'From time to time, I feel that political issues may not have direct and immediate effects on us. For instance, the Public Order Ordinance posed a direct threat to the media industry only, not us. As long as the Government does not

enforce the newly enacted legislation, we are not that tangibly affected. On the contrary, if you spend less time on earning money, your dwindling income will directly and visibly affect you.'

(Miss So, 3rd year General Business Management)

'I have^{not} paid close attention to the spirit behind the Public Order Ordinance. If I do not want to be a politician, the legislation doesn't have much to do with me!'

(Mr. Law, 3rd year Biochemistry)

The above self-explanatory dialogues vividly demonstrate the dampening effects of instrumental individualism on our quasi-elites' political activism.

Last but not the least, their views on equality further illuminates their instrumental individualism.

B. Equality

(Supposing that the Baptist, Shue Yan and Lingnan College have upgraded their resources to be on a par with those of the two universities before your graduation, should the Government grant degrees to them?)

'Yes, we should grant them degrees.'

(But it will adversely affect your career, won't it)

'Oh, yes, I have to reconsider it!'

(Mr. Chan 1st year History)

'I catch what you mean.... Well, I've some sort of internal struggle between equality and self-interest. But I think I will finally endorse granting.'

(Miss Ng, 2nd year Sociology)

Their precept of individual achievement, or in a word, instrumental individualism again exercised influence on their judgment. It has palpably impeded them giving a straight-forward answer for espousing equality. As a result, 6 of them admitted to having some sort of 'internal struggle', 2 of them bluntly negated the granting of degree on their self-disclosed individualistic grounds, and only 4 of them affirmatively said 'Yes' to the granting process.

On the other hand, they seemed righteous gentlemen and ladies, upholding the principle of equality when their interests were threatened.

(The Government is considering to lift her

subsidies on half-fare service for the post-secondary students. Do you agree?) 'It's not fair, we are only students. Why doesn't the Government consider removing her subsidies for secondary students as well?'

(Miss Tang, 3rd year English)

Among the overwhelming majority opposing the removal of subsidies, the principle of equality was the common underlying backbone for their argument. Thus, being the captives of individualism, they were applying double standard in the service of their own interest!

To sum up this part on civic obligation, under the banner of freedom, our respondents had made themselves the arbiters of morality and freed themselves from the pressure of the alleged duty of social concern. Yet, leaving oneself free choice to define morality does not necessarily imply one's subscribing to egoism. The curx was, therefore, while granting so much latitude in moral beliefs to themselves, what were the values to which they were finally committed and that oriented their lives? To answer this question, we have elaborated this part with more in depth questions of their views on success, ideal life, equality and instrumentality with politics.

Their visions of success and ideal life, have

vividly shown their passionate concerns for individual, or at the most, familial comforts. Their subscription to instrumentality with politics and double standard on 'equality' did nothing but confirm their espousal of the value-syndrome of instrumental individualism. That very particular value, as our latter arguments in Chapter 6 will show, is a product of Hong Kong's historical, political, economic and cultural contexts. The contexts do not offer a collectivistic ethos to imbue its potential elites. Eventually, we witness a group of university political nonactivists, anchoring their sense of selves and purpose on 'cost-benefit' analysis of individuals' interests, and the intuition of feeling inwardly more or less free, comfortable and authentic....' (Bellah et al, 1986:79)

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have first proved that the selected group of 13 students were really political nonactivists judging from their low level of interest in politics and political participation. The complexity of politics, the 'remoteness' of political implications and the instrumental individualistic value of the nonactivists have contributed to their lack of interest in politics. Their lack of interest has

worsened their inefficacy complex. With that complex in political inefficacy and instrumental individualism, they participated politically only in less costly mobilized forms and in the mildly manner, when scarce blatant injustice arose in Hong Kong. No doubt, with their value of instrumental individualism, 'who sits in the Governor's House' is not their greatest concern. What concerned them more were the tangible policy outputs, which were deemed satisfactory at large. Thus, political activism of our actors and actresses have been dampened by the aggregate effects of their political inefficacy, favourable political trust of policy outputs and lack of civic obligation because of the instrumental individualism. Consequently, they played a spectator role in the political sphere, with the characteristics of:

1. Reluctance to be the initiators or leaders of political participation.
2. Minimizing personal costs during political participation.

CHAPTER THREE

Present Activists' Political Attitudes

In this chapter, we aim at discussing the political trust, political efficacy and civic obligation of the 10 interviewed activists. After that, a comparison of the attitudes between the activists and nonactivists will be made so as to throw light on the importance of those attitudes.

To start with, how do we know that the selected 10 students were activists? While it is impossible to draw a distinct demarcating boundary between the activists and nonactivists, we have carefully chosen those 10 students so that it is beyond reasonable doubt that they had been activists at least for a year during their campus life. In fact, except one of them, all have been actively engaged in student union or student newspaper for at least 2 years.

To establish they were political activists among the students, let us first look at their interest in politics. We found that, firstly, all of them read newspapers everyday; secondly, they all regularly read news magazines predominantly with specific issues in their minds. Thirdly, they have constant discussion on

political issues with others. Lastly, only one of them had misidentified Lydia Dunn and S.Y. Chung as the most senior unofficial members in LegCo and ExCo respectively. (Only 7 of nonactivists made correct identification). Hence, their interest in politics could be undoubtedly reckoned as high. Regarding political participation, they had all been leaders or the cores in political events, trying to influence either the Hong Kong or Chinese Government. The controversy over direct election, Public Order Ordinance and Daya Bay in Hong Kong, and opposition to anti-liberalization movement in China, were but some prominent examples. Hence in brief, they were all political activists as what we defined earlier.

Next, we will first look at their trust of our Government. Have their relatively higher political activism^{been} prompted by a relatively lower political trust vis-a-vis the nonactivists?

I. Political Trust of Leaders

Unlike the nonactivist, this group of quasi-elites did not naively praise upon Youde because of his flying around. Instead, his so-called contributions to the settlement of Hong Kong's future were severely doubted and even denied.

'We know too little of what were behind his moves. We don't know whether his flying north was for the U.K.'s business deals or for Hong Kong people's interests. Nor do we know his endorsement of fixing our exchange-rate a strategy in their 'public opinion war' against China or in the service for our interest In case U.K.'s and Hong Kong's interest clash with each other, he will look after U.K.'s interest first!'

(Mr. Choi, 3rd year, 87 Chairman, CUSU)

'Youde was only a diplomat sent from U.K.. He would place U.K.'s interest above that of Hong Kong.'

(Mr. Chung, 2nd year, 86 Chairman, CUSU)

'I agreed that he seemed to have been hardworking. But a good governor should be responsive and representative of public opinions. During the Sino-British talks on our future, no disclosure of details was made. Only an office collecting public opinions was set up after the signing of the Agreement. As a Queen's servant, he was bound to be so' (Mr. Lee, 4th yr. 85-86, Chief Editors, Student

Newspaper, CU)

Hence, though 2 of our 19 respondents affirmed his contributions during the Sino-British talks, the overwhelming majority only regarded him as an irresponsible and secret British delegate sent here for the U.K.'s interest. They doubted the sincerity of Hong Kong's top leader serving Hong Kong's interests. The belief that Hong Kong was only a pawn in British eyes were both widely and deeply ingrained among them.

When we turned to senior civil servants, i.e., Departmental Heads and Secretaries, they unanimously presented concrete pictures of able, efficient and distant bureaucrats in their evaluations.

'The capabilities of senior civil servants are quite strong, The ICAC's successful fight against corruption, the reduction of the seriousness of housing problems, and the set-up of District Administration Scheme are some good indicators of their high calibre.'

(Mr. Choi, 3rd year, 87 Chairman, CUSU)

'Those senior bureaucrats were capable generalists conducting sensible policies.'

(Mr. Lee, 4th year, 85-86 Chief Editor, Student Newspaper, CU)

Yet, good appraisal of those policy-makers' general calibre did not entail that they were deemed responsive. All of them expressed dissatisfaction with our senior civil servants' responsiveness to public views. The activists' passionate concern with democratizing Hong Kong was also read between the lines:

'As an elitist system, their responsiveness is less than satisfactory. Though public views may be wrong, what counts is the process of collecting and paying due respect to the voices of our people.'

(Mr. Choi, 3rd year, Chairman, 1987, CUSU)

As our activists have much confidence in senior civil servants' administration skills, then what made them more activist in changing governments' decision? Does the answer lie in their intense criticality of government's social policies?

A. Trust of Social Policies

To our surprise, in no sense can we claim that the activists' evaluation of governments' two social policies -- Housing and Education -- is less favourable than those expressed by the nonactivists.

'As the Government has provided decent housing units for so many people in Hong Kong, her housing policy can be counted as successful. In the functional area of education, it is good to see the implementation of the 9-year free educational scheme. The next educational improvement may extend 9 to 12 years. Despite the chaotic planning in our tertiary education, our educational services, taken as a whole, are quite good.'

(Mr. Lam, 3rd year, 85-86 Editor, Student Newspaper, CU)

'As far as the provision of housing units is concerned, the Government's housing policy is acceptable. Yet, the policy has also got such defects as poor management, escalating rent and financial deficits. For the area of education, it is plagued with many problems. The disorderly schooling systems, the excessive examinations, and the oppressive schooling

environment are all malaises of our educational institution.'

(Mr. Lee, 4th year, 85-86, Chief Editor, Student Newspaper, CU)

Though their comments on our educational policies compared less favourably than those on the housing policies, we should remember that the differences only resembled the situation made by our nonactivistes. No especially harsher comments than the nonactivists could be registered in general among our activistic leaders. Of utmost importance, our political activists frankly admitted that Hong Kong's social policies have been more 'reasonably' constructed and thus more acceptable.

'Time has changed. Though Hong Kong in the 80's still has some 'social contradictions', they are much less sharper, less suppressive, less exploitative and less conspicuous than those in the 60s. The blatant, corrupted policemen's soliciting 'protection fees' from hawkers and the involuntary relinquishing of seats in secondary schools out of financial hardships, no longer beset people today.'

(Mr. Choi, 3rd year, 87, Chairman, CUSU)

'I don't think that there exists no 'social contradictions', yet they are on the decrease and being dissolved. The government has seemed to become more 'reasonable' in designing the social policies. Thus, 'right' and 'wrong' is no longer as 'black-and-white' today as that in 70's. It is just difficult to see a totally perfect or purely evil policy. Taking the recently debated Central Provident Fund as a case. On the one hand, we should lend support to it because it provides security against hardships after retirement. On the other hand, it is not without reason for the government to refuse enforcing a compulsory provident scheme as it may adversely raise our productivity costs.'

(Mr. Chung, 2nd year, 86, Chairman, CUSU)

Conventionally, Student Union has taken up the role of militant leadership for the university students. They act as vanguards of social justice and wage confrontations against the government to crusade against injustice. Now, the unanimous agreement of the 2 chairman of Student Union on Governments' increasing 'rationality' in making policies would seem only deradicalize students' political activism. Hence, it

is more intriguing to see why they were still relatively more politically activist. The riddle became more bewildered as we found that they were deeply disturbed by the 'knowledge-inefficacy' during political participation.

II. Political Efficacy

The complexity of political controversies or social policies in a metropolitan city of Hong Kong has time and again made our activist leaders disoriented.

'When I drilled deeper into the debate of whether the rich should pay higher rents, I came across a problem which is so knotty that I was at a loss of what to do. In simple words, the entire debate resolved around the proportion of total budget that our Government should expend on housing in particular, and in Social Welfare in general. I felt myself lacking knowledge to reach a sound judgement on that 'big' problem of specifying unequivocal criteria for our overall resources allocation!'

(Mr. Wong, 4th year, 84-85, Executive Member, Student Union, New Asia College, CU)

The contentions social movement on the nuclear plant in Daya Bay, also threw our former chairman of Student Union into disarray.

'Though the nuclear plant seemingly poses a threat to Hong Kong people, but does nuclear energy play an indispensable role in modernizing China? While so many developed countries have been noticeably relying on nuclear energy, should we follow suit? Faced with the inevitable depletion of natural resources, how can we strike a balance between utilizing nuclear energy for social development and the conservation of our natural environment?'

(Mr. Tsang, 2nd year, 86, Chairman, CUSU)

From these two examples, we can observe that our activist leaders envisaged the social and political issues in a rational manner. With that manner of thinking, they sooner or later discover that all their decisions would be based on some complex premises with all sorts of ethical dilemmas or empirical uncertainties.

The situation was similarly encountered as far as China is concerned,

'In the past, when the champions for democracy were arrested in China, our previous student leaders could wage protests without hesitation against the blatant injustice. But now, while China is on the track of its complex modernization, it would be an extremely hard task to follow closely what was going on, not to say exercising appropriate influences on the Chinese Government with the intractable problems of modernization.'

(Mr. Tsang, 2nd year, 86, CHairman, CUSU)

With the prevalence of 'knowledge-inefficacy' among our activist leaders, it came as no surprise that in the past 4 years, the main political participation launched by the activist leaders in Hong Kong were

mainly confind^e to 'sloganizing-protests' against the Hong Kong's or Chinese Government's intrusion of some political ideas. (Law, 1987:373)

1. Submitting proposals to lobby for and delineate the structures of a democraticized future Hong Kong Government. (84-85)
2. Requesting the Chinese Government to have re-trials of 'democratic fighters'. (86)
3. Struggling for a tempory suspension of the Daya Bay Project. The activistic leaders had no idea whether they should definitively rule out the erection of the nuclear plant. (87)
4. Demanding China not to persecute Chinese intellectuals during the anti-bourgeoise liberalization moverment. (87)
5. Demanding the Hong Kong Government to remove the freedom-threatening PUBlic Order Ordinance. (87)
(The knowledge-inefficacy has caused internal division among Colleges, elaborated in Chapter 5.)

Hence, the activists'

1. general political trust and acceptance of Hong Kong's social policies'
2. complexity of social policies and political issues, and
3. students' rational mode of handling social and

political issues as well as their self-awareness of the debatable 'guiding principles' for actions have combined together to produce the following affects:

1. Scarcity of open confrontations against the Hong Kong Government for outrage over social issues.
2. Most of their political actions were triggered off by the governments, be it Hong Kong or Chinese, contravening their respectful and high-sounding political ideals of liberty and democracy. Yet, democracy or liberty were no panacea.

'Commitment to democracy doesn't automatically gives us the blueprint of when and how should Hong Kong be democraticized, nor did it tell us whether we should approve of the specialized details drafted by the Basic Law Drafting Committee. What we painfully lack now is an ideology. Democracy is not an ideology.'

(What do you mean by ideology?)

'By ideology, I mean a set of ideas that shows the institutional roots of most social malaises and whereby our political activism can be effectively guided towards building a better society.'

(Mr. Lee, 4th year, 85-86, Chief Editor, Student

Newspaper, CU)

In short, embracing an ambiguous ideal of democracy did not make our ambitious activistic leaders satisfied. As reported by Mr. Lee, they were very frustrated over their failure in submitting insightful 'packages' for Hong Kong's democratization. What was more, they suffered from the role-stress of failing to be ideologues or ideological proponents.

Yet, we should not be misled that their political activism had been totally dampened by their knowledge-inefficacy. At the very least, their espousal of democracy as a broad ideal, on the surface, has led them to make many crusades for it.

'I don't think there will be direct election in 1988 under the overwhelming pressure from China. Yet, we'll have to continue to strive for it. Or else, there won't be direct election even in 1991.'

(Mr. Choi, 3rd year, 87, Chairman, CUSU)

'Hong Kong Government won't care of what you said, say, for direct election. But, the more inactive and immobilized you are, the even less attention the Government will pay to your voices. Above all, through political

mobilization, students could have their consciousness changed and be educated.'

(Mr. Chun, 2nd year, 86, Chairman, CUSU)

Faced with the knowledge-inefficacy and China's opposition to democratization, it was striking to find that only 2 of the 10 activists show desperation and stopped continuing to be leaders in the student organizations. What exactly is the battery that provided ammunition for our activists' sustained activism? As what the following section will show, their political activism was mainly derived from a value system other than the nonactivists' instrumental individualism, conceptualized as instrumental collectivism.

III. Civil Obligation

In accordance with our finding on the previous Chapter, we would expect activists to display a strong sense of duty to be concerned with society. Yet, the answer was staggeringly unexpected : only 4 of the 10 (40%) compared with 23% on our nonactivists, endorsed 'social concern' as duty for university students. One cannot help wonder whether the low score has truly reflected our activists' sense of duty to contribute to

society. The puzzle comes to the light when we read carefully the messages among those 6 activists who either showed reluctance or said 'no' to the alleged duty of concerning society:

'When I was the chairman of the Student Union, our committee members wanted to ameliorate the prevailing political apathy among university students. So, through media, we 'taught', moralistically demanded, caricatured and even condemned their political inactivism. Yet, our acts were found to have deeply alienated fellow students from us. So we became 'leaders' with no followers, and the SU tended to be a democratic structure practising undemocratically a very few people's idiosyncratic views Consequently, moralistic demands and condemnation must not be adopted. More communication with our fellow students for mutual understanding are essential I feel very difficult to firmly answer whether we, university students have that duty or not, especially amidst an air of being skeptical about moralism.'

(Mr. Tsang, 2nd Year, 86, Chairman, CUSU)

'Personally, I hold a strongly positive view that I should be concerned with society. Yet, we should not force others to accept a view. Self-reflection is necessary in considering whether to accept a value or not. For those who disclaim having such a duty. I'll challenge him with questions till I believe that they have had enough self-reflections and self-awareness of the situations.'

(Mr. Lee, 4th year, 84 Chung Chi SU)

'I accepted that we have the duty. Until last year, many of my friends sincerely told me that the 'so-called' 'duty' was like a heavy moralistic cap seriously suppressing them. So, instead of bombarding them with 'duties', I would rather lead them to participate and experience the Daya Bay issue I'm still positive about serving society, but I should allow others choices '

(Mr. Choi, 87, Chairman, CUSU)

In brief, 2 significant points can be drawn: First, activist leaders past failing and alienating moralistic persuasions on students of having social concern have made them very sick of advocating 'social

concerns' as a duty. Thus, the nonactivists' moral relativism and resistance to moral persuasion has forced the activists to retreat the moralistic demands -- and that helps yield a misleadingly low score of civil obligation for our activists. In fact, all of them were still affirmative about the value of social concern to themselves as individuals.

When we asked their views on 'success', more light was thrown on thier commitment to serving society, i.e., collective interest.

A. Success

'I would place contribution to society as my first consideration in choosing my job. I can find self-actualization in such process.'

(Mr. Lee, 4th year, 85-86, Chief Editor, CU)

'After graduation, I hope of finding a job that can leave me enough time to continue my activities in the Meeting Point. I can do something to contribute to society there.'

(Mr. Yip, 3rd year, 86, Vice-Chairman. HKUSU)

'I am most concerned with the development of China. So, after graduation, I would try to

hunt for a job that offers ample opportunities to me to keep in close touch of China.'

(Miss Tao, 4th year, 85-86, Student Newspaper)

'The ultimate goal of my zealous efforts of demanding democracy, is to make everybody have the consciousness, courage and determination to face with and care about our world.'

(Mr. Choi, 3rd year, 87, Chairman, CUSU)

In fact, 6 of them placed 'contribution to society' as either the first or second most important criterion in job hunting, while other four could not give definite answers. In addition, also 7 of them explicitly expressed keen interests to be affiliated with political groups to further actualize their political ideals. Among the 4 who did not submit clear rankings of job-hunting criteria, their internal struggles between individual and collective interest were crystally clear:

'My own enthusiasm of becoming a professional producer of movies seems to clash with the more collectivity-oriented role of being a full-time staff in some political organizations. It's a hard choice for me to make.'

(Mr. Wong, 4th year, New Asia College, SU)

'If you care only about your own interests, you can lead a very comfortable life! So, somehow, I experience internal struggles between working for individual and collective interests.'

(Mr. Lo, 4th year, 85, Chief Editor, CU)

Judging from the above-mentioned majority's preference over 'contributions to society' in job hunting and minority's severe internal struggles, (Such struggles were even absent among our self-oriented nonactivists. Pursuits for individual interests seemed taken for granted!) The activists in general displayed a more intense and passionate concerns with collective interests than the nonactivists. Their relatively strong collective interest orientation was also manifested by their views towards equality.

8 of them affirmatively agreed that university degrees should be granted to other well qualified post-secondary college students. Only the other 2 admitted of having some internal struggles between individual interests and the principle of equality. Hence, an additional profile of their adherence to collective interests, which is much stronger than nonactivists', was embodied in activists' responses to

the question on 'equality'.

Above all, when we reminisce about the manifestation of the nonactivists' instrumental individualism in political behavior, we noticed that :

First, the amount of personal time, energy, and ego-threat were nonactivists' central considerations in determining their activism during political participants. As a corollary, they only played a spectator role in participation as dictated by the self-interested calculating formula.

Second, their relatively weaker commitment to collective interests and the likely result of lesser moral indignation with social injustice, entailed that the 'chance of successfully' influencing governmental decisions loomed large in their mental calculation of whether to participate.

By contrast, our activists,* to be revealed shortly by what they answered, generally displayed an opposite mode of collectivity-centered, and instrumental orientations. The orientations manifest in political behaviours as:

First, the amount of personal time, energy and ego-threat occasioned in political participations were relegated to much lesser importance. They were in general willing to commit huge personal resources to participating in political events if some collective

interests (mainly, democracy, liberty) were believed to be constructively entrenched through the participations. Thus, the relevance of fulfilling their collectivistic ideals became their central consideration of whether to participate.

Second, they had relatively stronger commitment to collective interests. Hence, they possessed more intense moral indignation with social 'injustice'. Their moral outrage inclined then to place smaller emphasis on the 'chance of successfully' influencing governmental decisions. Unless they felt totally hopeless of achieving their goals, the activists tended to take political actions to safeguard, consolidate and promote their treasured values (e.g. democracy, liberty). Their calculations were mainly directed to examining the effectiveness different strategies for aggrandizement of their political influences. In short, taking the 2 points together, the activists demonstrated a value syndrome of instrumental-collectivism.

To substantiate the above-mentioned first manifestation of instrumental collectivism in political behaviors, as they all occupied key roles in either Student Union or Student Newspaper, spending 3 to 4 or more hours a day on the organizational affairs was very common. In the midst of controversies over

Hong Kong,

'We tried very hard to follow and submit suggestions on the complex debates of democratization in Hong Kong. What were the problems of transplating Western models of democracy in Hong Kong? Should the Government be dominated by Executive Brabch or Legislative

(Mr. Lee, 4th year, 85-86, Chief Editor, CU)

Considering the complicated and polemic nature of the debate, it could easily be imagined that tremendous time and energy had been devoted to discussions about the ideals of democraticizing HONG Kong among the activists.

In addition, when some more short-lived issues were perceived to clash with activists' committed social 'ideals', speedy and laborious mass-mobilization might be the outcome. A case in point was the activistic students' mobilization to counter the Chinese Government's supressing student movements in China. Be it the involvement in long-run or short-run political participations, their sacrifice in term of personal costs for collective-interest were fully illustrated.

'Obviously, my term examinations results

worsened much ever since my active involvement

with the political debates of democratization.
As a Business Administration major, my chance of
entering big firms is reduced to zero '

(Do you regret about what you did?)

'No! What I have done is quite meaningful.'

(Mr. Lam, 85-86, Student Newspaper, CU)

(Have you waged any demonstrations to force the
government to change her decision? Do you think
they are radical actions?)

'I have done it in struggling for direct
election amidst the Public Order Ordinance
controversy. They are not radical at all. It's
productive to wage such open confrontations as
it can both arouse social concern and elevate
the self-awareness and self-determination of the
participants.'

(Mr. Lee, 4th year, 85-86, Chief Editor, CU)

'I participated in the marching against China's
suppressing student movement. It is nothing
radical. I'm not afraid to be an initiator. As
long as you think you are right in demanding
something, you can do it. I don't care the
price of being blacklisted during future
employment.'

(Mr. Chan, 2nd year, Chairman, 86, CUSU)

The above remarks, on the one hand, further (corroborated) their ignoring of individuals' 'cost' in struggling for the rights and justice, on the other hand, it also hinted at their possessing intense, emotion-laden moral indignation behind their alleged radical actions under the influence of the moral outrage.

'When we think we should speak up, we do it! Yes, we do give thoughts to the possible ways of raising our bargaining power, yet, we do not just sit and do nothing until we are quite sure of success in confrontations. If you always wait until you are sure of success, you will never take any real actions. We the CUSU, for instance, was only one of the tens of organizations opposing the immediate construction of Daya Nuclear Plant, your power looked so negligible that you would do anything at all if you only act on big chance of being successful! We should always have the courage to struggle for steering our own life instead of being manipulated!'

(Mr. Choi, 3rd year, Chairman, 87, CUSU)

'The Hong Kong Government won't institutionalize

democracy for us as a free gift! She only cares the U.K.'s interests. We must try to determine the life for ourselves through our own efforts and struggles!'

(Mr. Lo, 4th year, 85, Chief Editor, Students Newspaper, CU)

From above, we saw a small group of activististic quasi-elites, anchoring their sense of self and sense of purpose on the cost-benefit analysis of effective ways of fighting for collective interests. They were willing to fight for their ideals with some so-called radical means as long as a dim hope still remained. In short, the activists, under the spur of instrumental collectivism, played an activistic participatory role in political sphere as defined below:

1. Willingness to be the initiators or leaders of political participation.
2. Relative to nonactivists, they ignored their personal costs during political participation.

With our available findings, at this juncture, it is time to address our riddle. We were puzzled to find that a minority of university students, the activists, despite knowledge-inefficacy and general trust of Hong Kong Government's social policies, were still relatively politically activististic. My answer was: With

their flaming distrust of Hong Kong political leaders' genuineness of serving our interests, they had an especially stronger initiative of being self-determined. A natural corollary would be their espousal of the ideal of 'democracy', that promises the alluring gifts of self-determination and liberty! Hence, with their instrumental collectivism, plus the strong motive of being self-determined, they would either constructively or preventively defend, consolidate or promote such collective interests or values as democracy, liberty, right to social movement, right to physical security etc.. Those values then respectively triggered off political participation and mobilization for direct election, freedom of press, suspension of Daya Bay project and protest against China' suppression of student movements.

IV. Conclusion

We have explored in this chapter the activists' political attitudes, We found that, like the nonactivists, their general trust of Hong Kong Governments' social policies has lessened the imperative of waging political actions with regard to social policies. In addition, their feelings of lacking encyclopedic knowledge (knowledge-inefficacy)

to 'rationally' deal with the complexities and uncertainties associated with social policies and political reforms also frustrated their attempts at political participations. Thus, in the past few years, we could scarcely see open confrontations against the Hong Kong Government for outrage with social policies. Nor could we see activists proposing detailed blueprints for our future structure of democratic government. What we could see, were the incessant internal studies and discussions about Hong Kong's future within their organizations, submission of some 'grand' but loose principles on political reforms, and the ad-hoc political protests against blatant 'injustice' that clashed with democracy, liberty or other values they treasured.

Despite the narrow scope of political participation, we have to ask why the activists could still be politically more activistic as they shared high trust of Governments's social policies and high knowledge-inefficacy with nonactivists. The answer did not lie in their pervasive commitments to civic obligation in the universalistic form -- which states that ALL university students SHOULD be concerned with society. Instead, all of them endorsed that as a particular individual, he or she identified with the duty of having social concern. In addition, the preponderant

distrust among activists about our political leaders' sincerity in primarily serving Hong Kong's interests was higher than that of our nonactivists. Hence, a flaming sense of self-determination was more deeply rooted in our activists than nonactivists. Above all, when considering their views on 'success', 'equality', and 'mode of calculations with politics', the activists were judged to have the value of instrumental-collectivism. On combining the instrumental-collectivism, stronger distrust of leaders' motivation and passionate concerns with self-determination, the activists thus played an activistic participatory role in policies. The proximate causes and consequences on political activism of the two groups of students are summarily drawn as below:

Table 1: Orientations of Activists and Non-activist

Orientations		Political Activism
Activists	Stronger self-determination Instrumental collectivism Individual's duty to concern society Knowledge inefficacy (negative effect) Trust of social policies (negative effect)	(Relatively) higher
Non-activists	Political inefficacy Political trust (of social policies) Instrumental individualism	(Relatively) lower

Table 2: Resulting Mode of Participation in Political Sphere

Modes	
Activists	Activistic Participatory Role 1. Willingness to be active leaders in political participation. 2. Ignoring personal costs during political participation. (Relative to nonactivists)
Non-activists	Spectator Role 1. Reluctance to be active leader 2. Participation with minimum personal costs.

Though comparisons of the activists' and nonactivists' orientations and values can measurably enlighten us on our research problem, we should not stop at here. They do not live in social and cultural vacuum. They are, as what Peter Berger proclaimed, 'man-in-society'. What is more, different historical epochs also may bear different social, and cultural settings. Thus, to achieve more profound sociological understanding of students' prevalent political inactivism, we must situate our respondents' inactivism and its proximate causes (abovementioned values orientations) in the wider social, economic, political and cultural environments. Above all, the significance of those environmental effects can be mostly highlighted by reviewing those environments across different historical epochs. Thus, the next chapter will be devoted to exploring our problem by putting it in a wider contexts, with a historical comparative approach.

CHAPTER FOUR

Historical and Environmental

Map of Student Activism

Three epochs of student activism will be examined in this chapter, in our attempt to shed light on current students' inactivism from an environmental and historical-comparative approach.

The three epochs are:

1. Anti-Establishment and Nationalism-motivated era
(1970-1976)
2. Hong Kong-wide Social Reformism (1979-82)
3. Student Inactivism Amidst Political Restructuring of
Hong Kong. (1983-87)

Before we set out to delineate the causes and characteristics of each epoch, one point is worthy of our attention --- It will be seen that the scenarios in China have been inextricably interwoven with Hong Kong's student activism. Hence, we have to take the situations of our neighbour into account. Also, since this thesis is not a study of student movement, more space will be reserved for discussing the environmental factors of different epochs rather than the details of

the student movements per se. From now on, we shall walk back to the past and watch the scenes of the first epoch of students' activism:

I. Anti-Establishment & Nationalism - Motivated Era (1970-76)

Before we delineate the syndrome of student activism of this era, let us draw out its underlying internal and external contextual factors.

A. Internal

i. Social

a. Demographically

During late 40's and early 60's, dramatic inflow of Chinese refugees into Hong Kong contributed to a significant percentage of our population. (Chan in Kwan & Chan, 1986:15-16) Hence, quite a significant proportion of university students during the early 70's were either born or brought up in Hong Kong. While their parents were refugees fleeing to Hong Kong as sojourners, taking Hong Kong as a life boat to avoid being buried in the turbulent, bitter sea of China, (Hoadley, 1970:271), our first indigenous, new-born generation students, like the children of urban

migrants in the third world, (Huntington & Nelson, 1977:110-1) being brought up and educated here, harboured a deeper sense of familiarity, belonging and expectation about Hong Kong than their parents. As revealed in the riots,

'The events in 1966-7, ...demonstrated the rise of a generation of people who regard Hong Kong as their home and possess increasing expectations with regard to the Government'. (Kwan in Lin, Lee and Simons, 1979:162) Thus, for this very cohort of university students, Hong Kong was their home --- a condition conducive to civic concerns and actions if needs emerge.

b. Social Issues

Yet, Hong Kong in the 60's, a time before our respondents entering universities was plagued with social turbulence and problems. During 1966-7 riots, we experienced a 'trust crisis'. (Kwan in Lin, Lee & Simons, 1979:155) 'With inadequate political communication channels, the public could not believe that a foreign Government, i.e. a Crown Colony with appointed expatriates using English as the official language in governing, could genuinely care about the

common Chinese on the street, the Government apparently did not care to tell the people what it thought and what it did knowing that the Chinese, living as they were under a Colonial rule, would in any case remain skeptical or unthankful vis-a-vis the Government.'

Next, police corruption was so common that it was embedded deeply and taken for granted in the daily lives of people. (Lee, 1981)

Of no less importance was the struggle for enacting Chinese as an official language. Though the issue was called to the Government's attention by some elected councillors as early as 1964. (Kwok in Cheng ed., 1982:32-33), the demands were only entertained with indifference and deference by the Government for 7 years. All such social malaises constituted the inflammable undercurrents for activism among university students.

ii. Political

Political communication has often been regarded as an important component in securing political stability. Yet, during 60's, to repeat, the lack of effective intermediate organization liaising between the Government and the Chinese populace resulted in a devastating communication gap that eventually contributed to the riots. (Lau, 1982:149)

'The Chinese populace were not informed of the Government's policies and intentions and were amenable to distorted anti-system appeals, though they were not subsequently converted into anti-system actions.'

iii. Welfare & Economy

The Hong Kong Government had been very sluggish to take up its responsibility of formulating social policies. It was not until the 1960s that the Hong Kong Government, forced by the population surge, assumed the duty of providing services in education, medicare care, housing and water supply (Chow, in Kan & Chan, 1986:139) With the Government's wavering postures in immigration policy, extreme caution at the speed of evolving new social policy and the absence of well organized political lobby force for change, (Hodge, in Jones, 1981:17-20) the conception of social welfare as a privilege of citizenship did not surface till the early 1960's (Annual Departmental Report, 1963-64) As a result, the total sum of Government's expenditure spent on social welfare during, say, 60-61 and 65-66, was deplorably small. They took up less than 1% of the Government total expenditure. (Chow, 1984:90; Sung in Cheng, 1986:132-133)

Besides the lamentable inadequacy of social policies and welfare, the people's plight and living standard was also adversely affected by a relatively slower real income growth vis-a-vis the 70's. (Ho in Cheng, 1986:168)

Worst of all, the staggeringly high disparity in income distribution during the 60's (Gini coefficient in 1966 is 0.49, the highest as compared with those of 71 and 81) had done nothing but foster the image of Hong Kong as only as ugly capitalists' paradise in the eyes of the new generations with their particular cohort experiences.

Against the above mentioned social, political and economic environments in 60's, it is not bizarre at all for our respondents, before their entering universities, conceived Hong Kong as a city profuse with problems and injustice.

'During the riots, I saw some policemen abuse their force and beat the people at their disposal.... Besides, the seriousness of the unequal distribution of wealth is also most prominent....'

(Mr. Chan 72-75, Chairman of HKUSU and Hong Kong Federation of Students, HKFS)

The great distance between the Government and the people was also reflected in a research addressed to the Form Five students in the late 60's. It was found that among the students interviewed, only 9% felt that the Government understood their needs very well. (Mitchell 1969, vol. 2 2:344-45) In short, the blatant social political and economic malaise in the mid and late sixties had been imprinted on the minds on quasi-university students, thus disposing them to place a low political trust on both policy performance and leaders' motivation of the Government in her rule of Hong Kong.

iv. Cultural

With the non-prevalence of the TV sets during the childhood and adolescent (50's-60's) for this cohort of university students, our respondents unanimously said that many university students' value were affected by the thought-provoking magazines and books.

'The Chinese Students' Weekly (中國學生周報)
Youths' Paradise (青年樂園) and Pang Gu (盤古)

were three of the popular magazines among secondary and university students. The inflow of western ideas, like books and literature works on existentialism and liberalism and other

ideology were also appreciably read by many students before or/and after our entering universities. Thus, under the spur of those works, we were encouraged to think about our life goals and meanings....'

(Mr. Chan, 72-75, Chairman, HKUSU and HKFS)

What is most important, traces of collectivity-orientation was infused with those works which laid premium on students' idealism and serving of collective interests. For instance, in the opening speech for the magazine of Chinese Students' Weekly it says:

'To solve the problems of China, we need a cultural movement, If China is to become a strong and prosperous country, it must be industrialized and democratic.... All political, economic and social reforms must be based on new ideas, new life styles and a new cultural movement.... The youth have much potential to accept and develop this new cultural movement.'

(1953, July, p.1)

While in 1963, an obvious shift in editorial position of the magazine from its main concern over

China's development to concern over Hong Kong occurred. (The Chinese Students' Weekly, 1963, July p.1) Yet, its advocacy for youth's concern of Hong Kong's population, education and other problems, all reflected its sustained position of promoting collectivism. Nurtured under such media content, it was likely that at least some university students of this 'reading generation' were socialized to be prone to serving collective interests.

B. External

i. International Environment

Around 1968, student movement swept through the world. (Fung, in Review on HONG Kong student Movement, 1983:295) In France, United States, India, Argentina, West Germany, Japan and England, more than 20 student protests had occurred in each country between 68-69. Coupled with the massive outbursts of the student movement at a global scale, was the prevalence of the existentialism in the West in 50's and followed by idealism in the 60's. (The Seventies, Jan 1980) Under the combined agitations of the global student movements and rising tides of idealism, university students in the tiny colony, who had been comparatively much conservative, were in some measure challenged^{and} their_{an}

role as idealistic social vanguards was reminded by those events.

ii. China

Born and brought up in a colonial setting adjoining to its motherland, the students had ambivalent sentiments towards the Red China.

On the one hand, their adoption of physical artifacts, language, customs, and stories from parents all reminded them of their intrincating and inextricable historical and cultural ties with China (Shils, 1981:63), on the other hand, China was reportedly devastated and dominated by a totalitarian, as well as dehumanizing socialist Government. Thus, we find students caught in a dilemma.

All in all, university students of the early 70's, brought up in that particular turbulent epoch, were relatively more perceptive of the colonialism, blatant injustice and social malaises of the time than the latter two epochs. Nurtured under a cultural environment that contained some thought-provoking cultural products, our students, at least some of them, became soul-searching beings trying to orientate their lives. Under the spur of idealism manifested by international student movements, they dreamed of holding something, something tight enough for them to

anchor their sense of direction and their lives!

'Many newspapers, especially the rightist, made slashing comments on the alleged massive persecution of people during the Cultural Revolution. No one could be sure what was truth. Yet, we were caught between the dilemma of keeping aloof from a possibly totalitarian regime and approaching it for more understanding of our mother country.'

(Mr. Chan 72-75, Chairman of HKUSU and HKFS)

Against this background, it is my contention that it was some crucial issues, with their convergence, that sparking off the climax of the 'anti-establishment and nationalism' era of student activism.

First in 1970, the university students waged protests for legislating Chinese to be an official language. In 1971, protests were held against the Japan's invasion of the professed Chinese territories --- Tiao-Yu-Toi. While the two crusades were raised on nationalistic rather than political grounds, The Government's militant suppression of the Tiao-Yu-Toi movement had only entrenched students' national identification and anguish over a suppressive Colonial Government.

Second, the visit of the U.S. President of China and the strategic 'Ping-Pon' diplomatic acts had boosted the international status of the Mainland China to an unprecedented level.

Hence, (Third), 'The high-handed suppressive acts of the Colonial Hong Kong Government, and the rocketing international status of China, had jointly allured us to make a breakthrough of putting aside our phobia and antipathy over socialist China. Consequently, some students from the HKU embarked on their trip to China.' (Mr. Chan, 72-75, Chairman of HKUSU and HKFS)

Swindled by China's propaganda and the 'arranged' visits, the charmingly utopia-like portrayals of Socialist China after the trip, finally helped unleash students' suppressed emotional identification with their very source of blood ties, their mother country of China. (The Chinese Monthly, 1987, May:32)

In short, the politically activist university students during this era, were generally filled with nationalistic fervour. Yet, two important factions of activists with clear division emerged in 1973 in this epoch need to be differentiated: (by Mr. Tsang, 72-73 HKUSU)

The first faction is the majority Maoist-Nationalist 'Kuo-shui', (國粹) It was marked by unreserved

espousal of the socialist China's political platforms and organizing activities to promote students' identification with socialist China. Emotional appeal to students was their main strategy of publicizing their percept of 'love your country, counter the hegemony of superpower.'

Another key faction, the 'She-hui' minority (社會) was characterized by its identification with socialist ideas¹, and discredit of China as an embodiment of ideal socialism. They directed their energy mainly to ad-hoc, issue-oriented reforms of Hong Kong. Rational and theoretical critiques of capitalist Hong Kong and 'rational' cognition of socialist China was their main strategy in their opposition against the line of 'Kuo-shui'. The 'anti-corruption' campaign was a noticeable illustration of their issue-oriented reformism in Hong Kong.

C. Conclusion

During the epoch of 70-76 the activistic students played two major social roles: one is promoter of knowledge and identification of socialist China, with implicit or explicit critique of capitalist and colonial Hong Kong. The other is the active initiator

or ardent fighters in reformist pressure politics, that was made possible in the relative absence of more professional pressure groups. (Besides the anti-corruption campaign, for instances, they had also launched campaigns against inflation, unemployment and raising of telephone fees.) (The Chinese Monthly, 1987, May:35-36)

Yet, how do we know that student activism of this era was 'higher' than 2 other epochs? While it is hard to arrive at a definitive answer, one important clue is present, according to Mr. Chan's remark, the activist participants actively participating in the affairs of Student Union was more than one hundred. (Our present activist, Mr. Lee put the figure at forty something, a much lower figure) Considering the relatively politicized nature of the affairs of Student Union, the discrepancy between those two figures confirmed our idea of students' relatively higher political activism in the past than the present. But how could we account for the generally higher political activism of the era by both its historical contexts and our proposed attitudinal, intervening variables of trust, civic obligation and efficacy?

First, to recapitulate, the problematic social, economic and political contexts of the 60's and early 70's have predisposed students a low (vis-a-vis 80's)

level of political trust towards the Governmental policies and leadership. In addition, the cultural environment that advocated self-awareness, idealism and serving collective interests also contained activating ingredients for students. It might be an important factor to explain their unanimous negative answer to the following question by our 7 activists:

(Is there open challenge against the saying that students have obligation to be concerned with society?)

The activists supplemented that the obligation was more or less a norm that few dared to raise open challenge.

Taking the existence of the norm and the idealism-oriented or collectively-oriented magazines together, it was likely that students of that era were in general relatively less individualistic than the present. Hence, the Colonial Suppression in the issue of Tiao-Yu-Toi, and the appealing portrayal of an utopian Socialist China, had precipitated and provided substances for actualization of their idealistic value and latent nationalistic orientations. The issues agitated them into pressuring Government for local reforms and promotion of identification with Socialist China. Through taking

those actions, they found anchorage for their sense of purpose and directions for their lives. That is why, when we raised the following question to our activists,

(Will you consider your chance and ability of successfully influencing Government before your actions?)

Their similar answers were:

'When I decided to have a public marching to the Governor's House in protest against the rise in telephone fees, I didn't care whether the action would be efficacious. I thought I was right, so I didn't hesitate in taking actions '

(Mr. Mak, 75 Chairman, HKUSU)

Thus, political efficacy did not seem to be operative on their political activism. What triggered off their actions seemed to be a low trust of Government, plus a moral sense of justice inspired by their relatively greater adherence to instrumental collectivism.

II. Hong Kong-wide Social Reformation (1977-82)

A. External

i. China

With the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, and unintermittent exposure of the brutal persecutions and holocausts during the cultural revolution, the idealistic and nationalistic students of both key factions were hard hit. The blows on the 'Kuo-Shui' members, who invested unreserved confidence on their utopian Socialist CHina, was especially disastrous. With the successive open-ups of her scandalous and covered political struggles as well as underdeveloped economy, the activists became frustrated, disillusioned, disorganized, devitalized and even cynical.

'Many Kuo-shui members couldn't accept the fact at the beginning. After the anomic stage, many of them became cynical, and, suspicious of any grand and idealistic platforms.'

(Mr. Chan 72-75, Chairman of HKUSU and HKFS)

With the disorganization and devitalization of the two main camps of activists, the burning fire of

utopianism and idealism as a campus subculture waned quickly. As a corollary, rationalism, reformism and realism came to supplant the subsiding 'idealism and anti-establishment' in our activists' subculture.

'We tended to be more cautious than ever. Facts and reasoning are taken as necessary tools in analyzing and deciding on the stands of Student Union in face of controversial issues. Besides, we tended to place more stress on accountability to the student body. We did not want to repeat our old mistakes! Nor did we have any vision of more than launching small-scale social reforms in Hong Kong To some extent, the Hong Kong Government could afford us political stability. In addition, we experienced psychological struggles if we, though still 'nationalistic', return this colony to China immediately. There is a glaring gap in living standard between 2 places '

(Mr. Tam, 78-80, Chairman, CUSU)

ii. International Environment

The general subsiding of student movements in the international scenes subsided at large. Moreover, the uncovered underdevelopment of Socialist China, the

cruelty displayed by a new Vietnamese Government, the invasion of USSR on Afghanistan and the communist Governments' suppression of solidarity union movement in Poland, all casted landsliding breakdowns in the idealistic or left-wing ideology in the world.

(Cheung, 1987, May : 33) In a nutshell, the abrupt changes in the external environments of Hong Kong injected strongly rational, realistic reformist or even conservative elements into our leaders' subcultures.

B. Internal

After the shocking alarms of the riots in 1966-67, which indicated an explosion of an undercurrent of a social discontent and political distrust, the Hong Kong Government introduced revolutionary innovations in both political social sectors.

i. Political

The Government exerted much efforts to narrow the communication gap with the masses after the riots. The institutionalization of the City District Office scheme in 1968, the strengthening of the Government Information Service in 1967 (Kuan in Lin, Lee & Simon, 1979: 156-7), the blossoming of the advisory committees (Miners, 1986: 151-155) and the sponsoring of the

Mutual Aid Committees affairs throughout the 70's (Lau, 1982: 145-9) were all indicators of Government's efforts in that respect. Though the integration functions of those official or semi-official channels for the ordinary Chinese were thrown into doubt (King, 1973: 29-30 ; Lau, 1982: 155). We could hardly deny totally their bridging functions between the Government and the populace. As a result, at least some conflicts were absorbed, diluted or dissolved by the upgraded political communications. The re-orientation of the Government's policy outlooks carried much significance in securing political trust and dampening massive political activism of the students.

ii. Social Policies

To start with, first, the explosive, overtly colonial measure of discriminating against the Chinese language was removed gradually. 'In 1974, the Government responded to public demands by legalizing Chinese as an official language.' (Kuan in Lin, Lee & Simons, 1979: 158).

As the discriminative measures were gradually withdrawn and existent in covert forms, moral outrage with Colonialism naturally subsided, as reflected in the negligible importance of race in self-identification among the young generation.

(Cheung, in Lin, Lee & Simons, 1979: 137)

In addition, the Governments' setting up the high-powered Independent Commission Against Corruption, signalled her determination to clean up our society and actively intervene in social policies. (Kuan, 1979: 165) The 10-year large-scale housing scheme launched in 1972, the Home Ownership Scheme in 1978, the 9 year's free education in 1978, and the wide-ranging labour services offered throughout the 70's (Chow, 1986:140 ; Choi & Chan, 1979: 184-187) were all remarkable manifestations of Government's reoriented active role in the provision of social services. Judging from the rocketing expenditure in social services by 21 times from 1970-71 to 85-86, and its increased share of the Government expenditure in total GDP from 38 to 45 percent, (Chow, 1986: 140) The ongoing trend of the Government's shifting role from 'laissez-faire' to 'discreet guidance' in the provision of social services was precisely reflected. (Hong Kong 1976, Report for the Year 1975) Moreover, besides the mere gigantic rise of expenditure, the flexibility of centralized forward planning was also enhanced after the administrative reorganizations that followed the McKinsey Report. (Lau, 1982: 62)

As there was a time lag between the policy planning and policy impacts, the policy benefits of the

innovations grew more and more tangible from the early 70's onwards. Hence it explained in part the still inflaming student activism in the mid-70's of the first epoch. The fact that diffuse support of the Government grew visibly with time, confirmed the growing tangibility of the improved social services and standard of living among the populace. (Lau,1982: 104)

iii. Economic

The dramatic and sustained economic growth throughout the 60's and 70's have also gradually ameliorated the 'economic contradiction'. First, the (Lee, 1982,:24-25) Gini coefficient, that shows the level of disparity of income distribution, fell from 0.48 in 1961 to 0.43 in 1971. The slight rise to 0.43 in 1976 was believed unimportant because of a tangible improvement in the absolute standard of living. (ibid.) Faced with such cohort experiences, the secondary students during early and mid 70's, could hardly experience the same level of unjust inequality before their entry into universities as their predecessors. Hence, again the base of an anti-establishment postures was diluted for the cohort of students who entered universities after mid-70's. 'Rising affluence and continual full employment has put an end to poverty on a mass scale. Only 5 percent of the households submit

themselves as beneficiaries of public assistance.'

(Hong Kong, 1980: A Review of 1979)

iv. Cultural

Industrialization, capitalist development nature of Hong Kong Government and the rapid social change of Hong Kong, have produced interlocking effects on our mass culture. While we must await the delineation of those forces till the final chapter, a significant intermediary agent that has been shaping Hong Kong's mass culture is television. Unlike the students of the first epoch; university students in the 2nd and 3rd epoch have been a generation of 'growing up with watching television.' With the setting up of Television Broadcasting Company (TVB) and the rising consumption ability of the populace, free television programs quickly attracted more and more watchers including the juveniles and adolescents. Up to the 80's, researches have repeated confirmed the commonplace that watching TV ranked the top among the leisure activities of the Hong Kong people. (Ng, 1986: 16 ; 1984: 7) What were the effects of our quasi-university students to be brought up as constant TV watcher?

'In spite of differences of opinions among social scientists as to how important mass media are in the

socialization process it seems safe to conclude that they help to shape a child's values, beliefs and habits.' (Dawson, Boylan & Yu, 1976: 155).

In accordance with the limited documents on local TV contents and advertisements, consumerism, individualism, materialism, hedonism and 'enjoy now' were all the hidden messages conveyed to their audience. (Chan in Chan and Kwan, 1986: 222-223). Regarding the dramas and films broadcast on TV, according to a sociologist's observation, family ethics, honesty, brotherhood, affection, mutual help and other Chinese traditional values were embodied in the 50's Cantonese films and TV stories until 1976. (Lenny, 1981) Changes in TV contents occurred after that. It was reflected in a survey in 80's (Mok, 1986?: 62), TV dramas were dominated by materialism and calculative, individualist careerism. Hence, with the intensifying infusion of instrumental individualism throughout 70's and 80's on TV programs, university students of our 2nd and 3rd epoch, 'the TV generation', before their entering universities, may have already acquainted a relatively stronger instrumental individualism than those of the 1st epoch, the 'generation of reading books and magazines'.

To sum up this part, with the unmasking of the utopian China's traumatic malaises, university students became more reformist, realistic and rational in their political activism. Being rational meant that they had to study and comprehend the complex scenarios of China before taking any political actions. Consequently, there was rife inefficacy among students to comprehend and to influence the hugely complex and authoritarian socialist China. Such inefficacy, plus their rocketing political trust of system output of Hong Kong's political system and incessant forces of westernization, all contributed to the waning of nationalism. Thus, only few students devoted close attention and rigorous energy to actualizing their concerns over a backward China. Consequently, the fact that China was a bitter sea could not spur widespread political activism in campuses. Even for the activists, their political activism was mainly confined to sloganizing protests against China for undemocratic practices (e.g. . suppression of democratic movement in 1979, 1980; Law, 1987:35)

In Hong Kong, with the increasing visibility and tangibility of improved social services, dwindling disparity of income and Colonialism, and rising real income and thus life satisfactions, (Lee, Cheung and

Cheung in Lin, Lee & Simons, 1979:91) students' general political trust of the political system grew and the Hong Kong society lacked the seeds of palpable social injustice in this epoch to activate widespread students' political activism as what was found in the last epoch. Yet, the increasing interaction between the bureaucratic polity and the Chinese society also promoted the public's dissatisfactions with policy outputs. Frustrations and political actions arose as a result. With the proliferation of more 'professional' pressure groups since the early 70's, our minority activist students, instead of playing the role of initiators of pressure politics, began to act as co-workers with other pressure groups. Their cooperation in the 'arrest of sampan people' (1979) was a prominent examples.

Last but not the least, as the 'TV generation' replaced the 'reading generation', the discrepancy in media contents threw the pendulum of university students' culture from the comparatively stronger instrumental collectivism to that of instrumental individualism. Taking the above results together, a lesser political activism was thus observed in this epoch vis-a-vis the former.

III. Student Inactivism Amidst Political

Restructing of Hong Kong

A. External

i. China

With the implementation of the modernization and open-up policy, the bureaucratism, the back-door tactic, nepotism, corruption, undemocratic practices and her economic underdevelopment were fully unveiled to the Hong Kong people.

'Though I identify myself as a Chinese, I found that Hong Kong Chinese are very different from those in the mainland during my travel. They are much selfish and have very bad manners....'
(Miss Tsuen, 1st year History)

'My uncle came to Hong Kong few years ago. I found that he was quite selfish, wary of his own interests and reluctant to put his trust on others.... I felt a great distance between us. Chinese on the mainland seemed very different from us!'
(Miss Ng, 2nd year Sociology)

Besides the bad images incurred about China under her open-up policy, the incessant impacts of westernization, and the inadequate cultivation of knowledge and emotional identification with Chinese culture under our educational system (Ming Po, 1987 June 1), have further sapped the nationalism of the university students in the 80's. Hence, it is of no wonder that only 20.6% of primary and secondary students identified themselves as Chinese in their major axis of self-identification. (Cheung, in Lin, Lee & Simons, 1979:137) Considering their ages and timing of Cheung's research, some of them are just university students now. Hence, a research on value profile of local university students indicated that 'National Safety' was ranked only 14 out of 18 choices of intrinsic values. (Lau, 1986:12) From another research conducted on freshmen of New Asia College, CUHK, only 2 out of above 400 students opted 'love our country' as one of the 5 most important values for them. (Dean of Students Office, New Asia College, 1987, April)

(Do you have any emotional identification with China)

'Yes, I think I am a Chinese.'

(But how do you express your feelings towards China)

'When the national team of volley ball won in a match, I would applaud.... I didn't know much about China. It seems too complex for me to grasp.... I found myself even more powerless to change a totalitarian China than HONG Kong.'

(Mr. Ma, 4th year, General Business Management)

With superficial emotional identification and inefficacy to do anything to change a perceived non-literal, oppressive and future master, their waning nationalism and rising pragmatism with treasuring Hong Kong's stability and prosperity ironically spelled the advent of 1997, their return to mother country as a haunting threat rather than a blessing.

'Though I identify myself with the Chinese culture, I disidentify myself with the irrational, oppressive and authoritarian Chinese Communist Government.... Daya Bay had further impressed me with CCP's unresponsiveness and irrationality. NO one knows what will happen after their take-over of Hong Kong in 1997. So, I'll give serious thoughts of getting a passport for emigration as a safety valve'.

(Miss So, 3rd year, General Business Management)

ii. International Environment

While the general downfall of radical student movements and ideology of the 2nd epoch continues, the neo-conservatism in the Western bloc, as symbolized by the popularity of Regan's and Thatcher's Governments, and the pragmatism displayed in the rife economic reforms of the Communist bloc, seem further militate against the budding and resurgence of radicalism on the international plane.

B. Internal

i. Political

In this epoch, the greatest departure of Hong Kong's development from the last two patently lies in its fundamental political change. 'Guided by the percepts of 'One country, 2 systems' and 'Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong', we witness the highly specialized and politicized processes of local political reforms and the drafting of the Basic Laws getting underway. Simultaneously, a huge range of opinion, electoral, functional and political groups emerged to join the race of articulating their views, pressuring the Government and seizing their power from early 80's onwards. (Leung, 1986:25-53)

In addition, after the severe conflicts with pressure groups and the people involved during such issues as 'arrest of sampan people' (1979) and the forced resettlements of fire victims (or squatters) into the New Territories, the Government seemed to be more tactful in avoidance of severe open confrontations. Moreover, to secure her legitimacy and the smooth transference of Hong Kong's sovereignty, avoidance of militant strategies and conflicts through more consultations and discussions with pressure groups by the Government have been adopted in this epoch. (Mr. Fung, present SOCO director, 1972, HKUSU)

Taking the above solid facts together, the students of this epoch, be they activists and nonactivists, feel even a greater sense than ever of 'knowledge-inefficacy' in dealing with the highly specialized political restructuring of Hong Kong on the other hand, and found more difficult to find fault with a more consultative Government than ever. The submerged severe pressure politics and the continuous blooming of more resourceful pressure and political group also subjected the role of students to lesser importance. (Elaborated in Chapter 5) Hence, the resultant lesser political mobilization of students in campuses led to even lesser political activism.

ii. Social Services & Economy

Entering into 1980s, some factors adverse to the accelerating expansion of social services were operative. The slower growth of Hong Kong's economy owing to worldwide recession and dwindled local investments, plus the preoccupation of Youde with negotiations over Hong Kong's future, have slowed down the development of the social services. (Chow, in Kwan & Chan, 1986:141) Yet, as the percent in total Government spending taken up by social services in 81-85 are on the average larger than that of 77-81, (Kwan in Kwan & Chan, 1986:162) coupled with the fact that huge expenditure on basic social services have already been implemented in 70's, we can see no sign of widespread and explosive groaning of inadequate social services from the populace.

Regarding the income inequality, though the Gini coefficient rose to 0.48 in 1981, the widening of inequality in the 1970s is largely a statistical artifact and should not cause undue concern. Although nuclear families earn less than larger families, the per capita income of nuclear families may be higher. The low-skilled immigrants from China were included in the computation of the 1981 Gini coefficient and they were absent in the 1976 computation. In reality, the

real income of most immigrants rose considerably as a result of migration.' (Sung, in Cheng, 1986:136) In fact, according to a latest research (1985) conducted on common people in Kwun Tong, (personal communication with Dr. S.K.Lau), the lower class expressed the view of compatibility of interests with the capitalists. Thus, an expanding sum of game, rather than a zero-sum game, in scrambling for societal resources, may be perceived by common people at large in mid 80's. Thus, the sustained political trust of Government in terms of policy outputs continues to militate against forming a social base for political activism among university students in the 80's.

iii. Cultural

With the TV advertisings and programs continually spreading utilitarianism, hedonism, (Chan, 1986:223) personal achievement as success, and freedom, university students in the 80's, who were 'a generation of TV watchers', were even more susceptible to 'instrumental individualism' than those of the 2nd epoch. This speculation was partially supported by researches that half of the youth took what they saw in the TV as true. In addition, the youth aged between 14-17 are the most active viewers watching TV for more than 2 hours everyday. (Mok, 1986:68)

To sum up this part, we first look at some research findings. According to Lau's value profile on university students. (1986:12), out of the five most important intrinsic values selected by the students, 4 were individual and achievement oriented. For the 1987 CU graduates, promotion prospects was ranked the most important orientation during their career choices. In addition, out of the limited data on freshmen's considerations on choosing their majors, (83-86, Appointment Service, CUHK; 86, Office of Student Affairs, HKU), all unanimously showed that 'interest' and 'career prospects' were respectively their first and second considerations out of 6 criteria. But since some students might build their interests on career considerations too, the importance of 'career' or 'personal achievement' becomes most prominent. Concerning moral relativism and freedom, only 3 out of more than 400 freshmen of the New Asia college, CUHK, regarded 'morality' as one of the five most important values. (Dean of Student Office, New Asia College, April, 1987) What was more, during the early 80's, complaints about 'being indoctrinated to be concerned with society' were uninterruptedly made by the freshmen in the two universities during the orientation camps. (Records of Orientation Camps, 81-82, New Asia College, CUHK) Freshmen appealed to 'personal freedom' as a

rationale of their complaint. It should be stressed here that such open questioning of this particular alleged duty of the university students was absent during the 70's, in accordance with our past activists.

Putting all facts mentioned together, we are suggested that the instrumental individualism found in the nonactivists we interviewed were likely a typical value among university students of this epoch. They cared most about their individual achievement and freedom. Under the banner of freedom, they shook off the 'shackle' of the 'duty' and walked close to the pole of moral relativism. With themselves as the arbiter of moral value, they questioned why they ought to be concerned with society. With their calculative and individualistic orientations, they doubted the 'cost-effectiveness' of having political activism, when only uncertain and indirect rewards might be granted in political games. With their general satisfaction of policy performance and political inefficacy of both comprehending today's specialized politics and influencing Britain or China, our 'TV generation' would rather dodge their heads away from the remote, uninteresting and complex politics.

All in all, faced with the greatest political inefficacy among all 3 epochs, and a political trust of the policy outputs, plus a prevalent instrumental

individualism, the lowest ebb of political activism scored in today is a product of social, political, economic and cultural context.

C. Conclusion

From the above review of Hong Kong's historical context throughout 3 epochs, we witness a lot of changes. From a colonial, oppressive to a consultative, 'rational' Government, from a developing economy with a blatant income disparity to a developed economy with sustained and rising standard of living, from a laissez-faire philosophy to discreet guidance and provision in social services, from relatively less individualistic cultural environment of books and magazines to a more individualistic cultural environment of TV, and from an ambivalently diffuse to a realistically waning nationalism, Hong Kong's internal and external changes, have depleted the social and cultural basis for political activism among our university students with time. Against this background, the dwindling political mobilization by activists in campuses will also be illuminated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

Activists' Political Mobilization

'One man by himself is rarely able to persuade Government to modify its policy. Successful influence normally depends on lobbying of an organized group which can mobilize the various resources of its members....'

(Miners, 86:195)

In Chapter 2, we found that present nonactivists felt inefficacious to influence the Government alone. As the inefficacy inhibited their activism, it was of crucial importance to study the political mobilization potential of the university activists in order to explain the inactivism of today's students. Again, we will find that environmental or contextual factors of historical epochs largely circumscribe the political mobilization. Three broad categories of intervening factors were found to exert significant negative impacts on the activists' mobilization potential:

I. Relationship between Activistic Leaders & Students

Two factors are involved here. First to repeat, Hong Kong people was bombarded nearly everyday with news about democratization, direct election, Basic Law... etc ever since the signing of the Sino-British Agreement in 1984. The issues involved were so complex that all sorts of specialized knowledge in social science, law, aviation, shipping etc were demanded. The activistic student leaders, mainly of the Student Union and Student Newspaper, have concentrated their efforts on studying the democratization in Hong Kong. As the students at large found debates over democratization complex, they had not enough patience at all to devote their time to looking at the issue and acting as potential supports for activistic leaders' actions. Besides, their perceived inefficacy to influence the British and Chinese Government on that matter, plus their instrumental individualistic orientation with politics, all contributed to students alienation from the activists' preoccupation. Thus, the activists became leaders without followers.

Second, with an air of elitism and righteousness, the activists, as mentioned in Chapter 3, moralistically demanded, caricatured and even condemned students' political inactivism. Such reproches were found to

further alienate the students from them. Activists' mobilization potential was sapped further:

'They took themselves as the symbols of righteousness and adopted a demanding posture towards us. I found difficult to tolerate that.'

(Miss So, 3rd year Present activist, General Business Management)

II. Loss of Direction in Mobilization

With activists' adopting a comparatively more rational approach to social and political issues after their disenchantment with utopian China, plus the appreciable improvements in Hong Kong's policy outputs, activists had little conspiracy theory and thus less moral outrage with the Government outputs. Rational mode of thinking keeps a person cool-headed, and our cool-headed activists were often bewildered with their own positions in face of the multiple empirical and ethical consequences of policies made in a cosmopolitan and populous colony. Even in the issue of Public Order Ordinance, on which public outrage was inflamed and directed to the Government, ^{some} 'cool-headed' activist student leaders took a neutral stand,

'In this oncoming decade, Hong Kong needs a stable environment for smooth transference. As it is conceivable that some businessmen might produce false news in trying to reap a sum during the coming 10 turbulent years, the Student Union had not decided if it was justified to go against this Ordinance.'

(Mr. Choi, 1987, Chairman, CUSU)

In addition, the complexity of the issues sometimes was beyond their comprehension, not to say judgment.

'Exactly what did the safety figures of (Daya) nuclear plant mean? If we didn't use nuclear energy, what other available forms of energy can we utilize?'

(Mr Chan 1986, Chairman CUSU)

Even if they are committed to such grand precept as democracy or equality, they were baffled by the attempts of substantiating those slogan-like ideas in the contexts of Hong Kong.

Lastly with our Government's growing consultations and skills in connection with polemic politics, there is growing acceptability of Governments' policies among today's activists. The imperatives for mobilizing

students also thus diminished in the 80's.

Summing up this part, the scenes in the 80's of Hong Kong have sapped the need to mobilize. Even polemics occurred, the rationality-oriented activists were overwhelmed by knowledge-inefficacy in face of the specialized and complex issues to locate their own positions. They found themselves adrift in a big sea and had no idea of to where they should mobilize their followers!

III. Blooming of Pressure and Political Groups

First, two points need to be mentioned, with the blooming of many pressure groups like the Christian Industrial Council, the Education Section Group, the SOCO etc in the 70's, the role of initiator of students in the first epoch already receded to the role of co-worker with the pressure group in the late 70's. As those groups grew with time, they became more politically skilful and capable of soliciting more secret information, the students' role further receded to the role of supporters or 'suppliers of labour and skills' in the 80's.

'Today, when we launch a massive signing movement, or conduct a survey, we need students

support.'

(Fung, present SOCO director 1972, HKUSU)

Besides, the discontinuity of leadership in student organizations and their full-time student role also posed structural disadvantages for the student organizations vis-a-vis the 'professionalized' pressure groups. As a result, student activists' necessity and motivation of mobilizing students was diminished as some 'social injustice' might already be taken care of by other groups. Stepping into the 80's, the emergence of many political groups also decrease the activists' incentives of political mobilization:

'In the early 70's, students' public statements on media were unique and attention drawing. Today, we can nearly find press conferences and public announcements undertaken by flourishing political groups everyday. What we say might be put at a small corner of newspapers! In fact, we can't even compete for public attention with a single charismatic person like Martin Lee.'

(Mr. Lam, 3rd year, General Business management)

Second, with activists' frustration over failures of mobilizaing nonactivists in campuses, plus the

accountability they need to bear in waging political participation as student leaders, few of our activists preferred to influence the Government through pressure groups.

'I was interested in the scandal of public housing. But I participated in the issue with a pressure group. Acting in the capacity of student representative was much troublesome. You have to submit your reasons for participating in formal meetings for the sake of accountability.'

(Mr. Wong, Present activist)

Thus, a bad sign of "brain drain" further inhibits the mobilization of nonactivists in the campuses.

To conclude, the aloofness of nonactivists from the activist student leaders, the incapability of activists to fix their direction for mobilization and the escalating, dominant role of pressure groups and political groups in the 80's contexts, have jointly diminished the chance of mobilizing nonactivist. The instrumental and individualistic students, who mostly engage in only mobilized political participation, thus have their political activism fatally reduced in the 80's contexts of Hong Kong.

CHAPTER SIX

Student Activism -- A Reflection of Hong Kong Society

As fully illustrated from Chapter 2 to Chapter 5, the 3 proposed intervening, attitudinal variables -- the political efficacy, political trust and civic obligation -- have been demonstrated to be significant in explaining students' level of political activism. By supplementing the concept of civic obligation with students' views on success, ideal life situation, equality and instrumental orientation, we evolved 2 new concepts of instrumental individualism (for nonactivists) and instrumental collectivism (for activists). With instrumental individualism, low political efficacy and high political trust, we found that they jointly produced nonactivists' spectator role in politics (p. 89). With instrumental collectivism, high political trust and passion for self-determination (p. 89), they engendered the activists' activist-participant role in politics (p. 89). Finally, we painstakingly showed that the social, political, economic and cultural factors of Hong Kong and other external factors (especially China) were the main underlying forces influencing our political

activism through those intervening variables. Indeed it is my contention that our portrayal of student activism can well reflecte the ethos and the other unique features about Hong Kong. Student activism, like a microcosm of the Hong Kong society, first mirrors an ethos of mixed, diluted and contradictory nature for HONG Kong.

I. Marginality and Contradictions

Hong Kong, as a borrowed place from China to Britain, is a marginal city. It is marginal, in the first sense because of its embodiment of mixed origins of values borrowed from the aforementioned two countries. The mixed nature can be fully revealed in considering 2 values of the Hong Kong people -- nationalism and liberty.

For nationalism, in view of our inextricable and interwoven, cultural and historical ties with China, we do have, to various extents, some measures of nationalism. For liberty, under the liberal tradition of our Colonial master of Britain, Hong Kong has virtually enjoyed an enviable latitude of freedom well entrenched and protected by the Government. With China as the source of our nationalism and Britain as the origin of our liberty, we found that those two values,

inherited by Hong Kong's university students alike, have time and again been the underlying elements activating widespread student activism.

Spanned from the 'campaign for Chinese to be an Official Language' in 1970, through the precept of 'Get to Know China and Return to China' promulgated by HKFS in the early 70's, to the recent massive protests against Japan's distorting Chinese History on textbooks in 1982, all such student movements had been triggered off by nationalism.

Likewise, the more than 1000 signatures in CUHK for protesting against China's suppressing student movement in January of this year, and widespread outrage for Government's legislating a perceived 'freedom-threatening' Public Order Ordinance, reflected students' internalized value of liberty. Indeed, students' general subscribing to democratizing Hong Kong to safeguard liberty serves as a profile of the internalized nature of the value (Chan & Chan, 1987, unpublished research). Thus, again, this borrowed value from the British has repeatedly provided ammunition for student activism on a massive scale. Hence, it is of no coincidence for the emergence of present activists' slogan: 'Save China through democratization' -- a slogan embodying exactly the 2 important values with mixed origins, a trait reflecting

the first characteristic marginality of Hong Kong Society. The second characteristic of Hong Kong as a marginal city is the diluted nature of those values. What has led to a diluted nationalism?

First, the inexorable forces of Western ideas and Western style of living have been surrounding the indigenous, new born generation since their upbringing with schools, TV, movies, fads and so on. Besides, the miserable plights of China are in no compansion with the economic miracle and political stability of the tiny British Colony. Being a 'Chinese' becoming a much less graceful identity than a 'Hong Kong person'. Hence, in a 1987 research (Chan & Chan, 87 unpublished) directed to over 200 CU students, we find 56.6% of them identifying themselves as Hong Kong people, and only 31.2% as Chinese. The findings approximated ours as 70% of our nonactivist expressed a stronger identification with 'Hong Kong people' rather than 'Chinese'. When we asked our nonactivists to indicate the ways they expressed their feelings towards China, many of them found it difficult to articulate. The others just murmured their likings of Chinese music, literature etc.. Consequently, the powerful forces of Westernization, and the political and economic realities of the 2 places have jointly diluted the nationalism for Hong Kong people, the dilution was

especially true for the generations born in Hong Kong (including our respondents!) With the intense political inefficacy with the Chinese Communist Party and a rising instrumental individualism, our nonactivists' slender nationalism did not make 1997 as a chance to serve their own countries. 1997 was only their haunting nightmare pushing them to think of seizing passports as a safety outlet.

Closely allied with the co-existence of the mixed origin, there always lies a possibility of their Contradictions.

From our research, an interesting finding was that, the activists displayed a stronger adherence to nationalism. 6 out of our 10 activists articulated both their passionate concerns of China's misery and hopes of improving her lot during the interviews. 1997 was perceived by most of them as a challenge and a chance to devote themselves to their nation. The discrepant intensities of nationalism between activists and nonactivists lays the seeds for incompatible stands between the two groups on the one hand, and individuals' internal struggles on the other hand.

A concrete manifestation of the contradiction happened in October 1983, a time when Hong Kong's future remains unsettled. Amidst the 'opinion-war' between advocacy of continuing British rule and that of

'Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong', the Student Unions of the 2 universities sent a letter to the British Government pleading for the reverting of sovereignty and the actual executive power to China under nationalistic grounds. . (Ha Hei, 87, pp.18-23, HKUSU). Yet, under the strong opposition forces from the fellow students, the HKUSU was forced to withdraw its letter after the results of voting.

The strong base of the unorganized mass opposition, was found to lie in their fear of losing liberty, stability and prosperity after accepting Red China's package of 'Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong' (Ha Hei, p. 18 1987, HKUSU). Thus, despite students' general endorsement of China's taking back Hong Kong's sovereignty in 1997, their passionate concerns for other values, like liberty, obviously were in contradiction with their nationalism.

The students' demands for withdrawing the letter, in fact reflected sharply the popular, compromising and 'pragmatic' sentiments of the general public in Hong Kong. They preferred to 'have the sovereignty returned, but have the British rule over Hong Kong continued', a way out of the internal struggles over two values of liberty and nationalism.

In short, the above issue testifies to the contradiction of values with origins rooted in Britain

and China. But as the root of nationalism withers and the root of liberty blossoms in the ceded colony, the results of the voting highlighted the prevailing of pragmatic values (enjoyment of existing liberty, prosperity and stability) over the fading value of nationalism in the 80's Hong Kong.

II. Lack of Bases for Student Activism from Comparative Point of view

By looking at the important bases of student movements else-where, Hong Kong's student activism may be further illuminated.

A. Lack of Class Conflict

As stated in a renowned comparative study, (Klinebery, Zavalloni, Louis-Guerin, BenBrika, 1979:15), in Europe, especially in France, Italy and Germany, the students of the extreme left, heirs of a legally institutionalized left, continue to see themselves as the champions of the poor workers against bourgeois oppression! Does Hong Kong have the base for class struggle? Three types of factors have combined their forces to militate against class struggle.

First, even since the eruption of riots in 66-67 the Government has made every endeavor to defuse labour disputes.

Between 1967 and 1975, approximately 110 items of labour legislation were made. The Labour Relations Ordinance was particularly important as it equipped the Government with the right to defuse damaging situations. Consequently, the Government successfully mediated and diluted the conflicts in the labour disputes. (Kwan in Lin, Lee & Simons, 1979:161)

In the 80's, the pacific climate of labour forces keeps going. 'Strike are infrequent: only 11 took place in 1984, with a total loss of 3122 man-days, and 11 in 1983 with the loss of 2530 man-days, the lowest figures since 1958.' (Miners, 1986:33) Consequently, polarization into class conflicts is adversely affected.

Second, the labour unions in Hong Kong have failed to maintain a stable, strong and mobilizable base of workers.

'In many of the old unions, leadership has remained virtually unchanged since the 1940's'. (Ng in Cheng, 1986:275) 'The organization stagnation simply could not meet the present needs and aspirations of the younger, better educated, more inquisitive-minded and affluent workers of today.' Besides it was staggering to find that in a declared small union population of 352,306 at the end of 1983, there were 382 registered employee unions. The state of multi-unionism, that conduces to internal divisions, rifts, further devitalize the local labour movement. The chance of evolving class conflicts is further reduced.

The last and perhaps also the most important factor, is that with growth in real income and perceptible expanded social services provided by the Government, the rise in absolute standards of lower socio-economic group in the past two decades is crystal clear. (figures already shown in Chapter 4) Hence, the objective base of improvement in spirally rising living standard convinced the ordinary people in 1977 that 'there is always the chance of improving one's status if one has the ability and initiative and if one works hard enough.' (Lee 1982:25) A more recent research conducted in Kwun Tong in 1985, (Ming Pao Monthly, 1987, June) corroborate the view that the lower class

perceived their interests compatible with those of the capitalists. With the cognitive belief of an expanded sum of game on the part of the lower class, seeds of class conflict in Hong Kong can hardly grow unless incessant economic recession or crisis happen in the years to come.

Summing up this part, with skilful defusion of labour disputes, labour stagnation and an perceived 'expanding pie for all', our society in the 80's lacks the base for university students waging marxist protests against exploitation of the lower class.

Another base for rift student activism we lack is centered around university students themselves.

B. Elitist Status of University Students

In the 3rd world countries, multiple factors have been ascribed to explain students activism throughout the 60's (Soares, 1967:124-147; Klineberg, Zavalboui, Louis-Guerin, BenBrika, 1979) Among those factors, one was repeatedly confirmed as important --- whether university students were elitist and could get a respectable employment (Lipset, 1967:18-30)

In Hong Kong, with the data available, the story seems to be the other way round. There are some important clues of university students being elitists:

First, the average teaching-costs per university student in 1984 Hong Kong exceeds those in the U.K. and the United States. Considering the higher standard of living in these two places, our higher figure reflects the fact that huge resources have been invested in local university education. (Chung, 1987:16)

Second, less than 4.8% of the suitable age-cohort were attending degree-courses in Hong Kong. Even we add this 'figure up with other post-secondary students, the figure only stood at 10%, which is moderately low on an international level.' (Ching, 1987:17-20)

Regarding employment, with response rate exceeding 85%, only less than 32 first-degree graduates did not work (either voluntarily or involuntarily) out of more than 1000 respondents from 1982-1986 at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. (Appointment Service, CUHK) As the graduates from the University of Hong Kong are not perceived to be discriminated against, unemployment problem virtually is negligible for our elitist students. In addition, the average starting salary for

the CU graduates from 83-86 have been \$4533, \$4915, \$5514 and \$5538. Considering the fact that their starting salaries may be 3-4 times of Form Five to Seven students, their 'elitist' status is further confirmed. Consequently, in the absence of the frustrations arising from unemployment and loss of elitist status, our students lacked another base for activism.

C. Lack of Idealism

As repeatedly stressed in literature on student activism, a cultural environment conducive to idealism is a pivotal ingredient for promoting wide-spread and intense student activism. The Hong Kong students' dwindling commitment to serve collective interests, as what we argued earlier, well reflect the underlying key features that have been constantly at work in shaping today's a less than idealistic culture -- the individualistic culture. Considering the immense complexity involved with analysing 'cultural dynamics', we can at the best briefly suggest the following ideas to make sense of our society and the cultural change.

i. Inward-looking Familism

Historically, Hong Kong can be recoked a society formed primarily by Chinese immigrants. Cultivated under the traditional culture, our refugee parents generally put their familial interest as the first and foremost object of identification. Nationalism or issues related to public interests were only relegated to lesser importance.

While the influx of Chinese refugees into Hong Kong could be in part explained by the commonplace of their desires for political stability, another significant motivator for their fleeing lay in their fetishism of material wealth. It has been well documented that 'the immigrants coming to Hong Kong were a select group, many of whom were in search of material advancement when they made their decision to move' (Lau, 1982: 69). Besides, 'the lack of traditional Chinese moral constraints on uninhibited efforts at material gains in a migrant society such as Hong Kong sets free the rampant and rapacious desire for material advancement. The absence of gentry class, which in traditional China was the upholder of higher moral values, has removed a major obstacle for the pursuit of material values' (ibid.: 69-70).

Consequently, our refugee parents, and their new born generation, to various extents, regarded Hong Kong -- a Colonial setting ruled always by a few whites, a place that people tended always to get suspicious of her leaders' motivation -- as an arena for the pursuit of pragmatic, familial interests (especially material interests) under a stable environment with our Government as a guarantor of social and political stability (ibid.: 74).

ii. Stability and Prosperity as Government's Ideology

The Hong Kong Government realized perfectly well that her legitimacy was in no way rooted in the emotional identification of the Chinese populace towards an alien and colonial ruler. To sustain her general support derived from the Chinese society, she must always strive hard to guarantee political stability and a 'modest' level of standard of living. In addition, 'it must keep China happy with plentiful earnings of foreign exchange' (Miners, 1986: 47). Thus, the pragmatic goals of maintaining prosperity and stability have for long been her foremost concerns. Any deliberate attempts at social or cultural interventions into the Chinese society, in terms of building up a counter-culture, i.e., counter-familism or counter-individualism, were patently not possible, not

necessary and not desirable.

It was not possible since any such intervention requires both a massive capacity of a colonial bureaucracy and the ideological modifications of the bureaucrats' outlooks. 'Obviously, both capacities of both the bureaucrats are not adequate to ensure even a modestly successful attempt at social intervention' (Lau, 1982: 43).

It was not necessary since familism or individualism posed no threat to her mission of maintaining our stability and prosperity. Nor was it desirable as imposition of collectivistic ethos or any other similar moves might spell the intense antagonism from both the suspicious Hong Kong people and China adjacent to our territory.

Hence, complaints about Government's failure in providing 'suitable' guides on 'moral or civic education', especially before the Agreement on reverting Hong Kong's sovereignty, were always handled in low-keyed manner. Any detailed and specific 'moral guidelines' may engender oppositions and division in our society of which the Government is always wary. In short, the lack of Government's initiative of building a 'counter-familism' as a new tradition encouraged the budding of familism and individualism, especially under a growing capitalist economy of Hong Kong.

III. Fast Growth of Capitalistic Economy

Capitalistic economy, by its very nature, encourages competition, amoralism and individualistic achievement.

'The economic functioning of the market rests upon competition As opposed to the social stability in the medieval system, an unheard of social mobility developed, in which everybody was struggling for the best place, even though only a few were chosen to attain them. In this scramble for success, the importance of life was in being first in a competitive race (Fromm, 1959: 88).

With the lack of emotional 'nationalistic' identification with a colonial master, with the absence of moral surveillance from China's gentry class, and, with passionate anchorage on a stable and prosperous life style as their pragmatic and realistic life goals, in a borrowed place with borrowed time, the rampant ambitions of the Hong Kong people to pursue individual's (or at the most, the familial) success have been fully precipitated by a miraculous development of a capitalist economy in Hong Kong from the 60's onwards. Brought up under this capitalist culture, we thus find our new generation, including our present university students, unavoidably immersed with the values of self-actualization, mass consumption and

hedonism -- as depicted by Daniel Bell, (1978: xvi) capitalism was marked by a distinctive culture. 'In culture, this was the idea of self-actualization, the release of the individual from traditional restraints and ascriptive ties

Through the far-reaching and all the more powerful mechanism of TV, as elaborated in Chapter 4, the capitalists' advertisements, that promoted individualism, hedonism, amoralism and 'enjoy now' orientation (Chan, 1987: 223), have indeed grown up with our new born generation.

Hence, our present nonactivists' moral relativism and instrumental individualism, has also been rooted in our capitalist nature of society as well.

To sum up this part, our familism, 'borrowed nature' of society, disidentification with our political leaders, non-interventional role in cultural traditions and pragmatic ideology of the Government, as well as the rapidly developed capitalist economy created the inexorable shaping forces of culture and character. They have deprived the budding of seeds of collectivism, or idealism in the soil of Hong Kong. Consequently, after the emergence of the surging trust of Government's policy outputs from the early 70's onwards and the disillusion with an utopian China after

1976, we can hardly see a high level of sustained student activism, which has been rooted in a growingly unfavourable soil of individualism. Seeking one's upward social mobility and individual achievement through hardwork in apolitical arena, becomes a more direct, pragmatic, and alluring channel than the political ones for our university students of today. (Huntington & Nelson, 1976)

. Student Activism in the run-up to 1997

Last but not the least, we will end the entire thesis with some projections about the student activism before 1997 in Hong Kong. As student activism needs activist mobilizer and the followers, we shall look at each group separately.

A. Activists and their Organizations

Both structural and dynamic factors engendered by social change work against an active and widely supported role played by the activists.

1. As asserted by Di Palama (1970), modernization 'discourages participation by creating a complex organization network based on high specialization and

division of labour that requires participants to possess unprecedented expertise.' Hence, techno-bureaucrats' expertise were predicted to be mostly valued in post-industrial societies. (Bell, 1973) Hence, as Hong Kong continues to modernize and politicize, all sorts of expertise will be urgently required to analyse social and political issues. In the coming decade, a time that confidence crisis probably reaches its peak, the Hong Kong Government will for sure, be prudent on all measures. It will avoid controversial, explosive actions as much as she can, for securing her legitimacy and her graceful departure. The rationality-oriented activists, in their paucity of necessary expert knowledge to review the highly technical and complex issues, would be overwhelmed by ignorance and remain undirectional.

2. Faced with the complex issues, four of our activists aspired to possess an ideology, by which they hoped, the institutional roots of social and political problems can be located and energy can be channelled to solve them. However, with their rationality approach, they invariably found difficult to decide on the proper course of actions with polemic policies. Policies in the cosmopolitan Hong Kong usually involve complex empirical and conflicting ethical consequences and

interests. Foolproof panacea can be hardly found that are 'functional' for all groups at all times in Hong Kong. Thus, their attempts of arriving at an once-and-for-all perfect solution, is doomed to failure. Besides, in our run-up to 1997, it is of utmost difficulty to formulate an ideology that can wonderfully integrate 'cosmopolitanism, westernism, anti-colonialism, pragmatism, anti-communism, nationalism, patriotism, economism, familism etc,' in order to maintain an 'equilibrium' for all sides, (Lau, 1985:28) Hence the odds are against their ideologization.

3. The 'structural' constraints on student activism remains with time: The transitory leadership role reduces the accumulation of skills and information. The activists' role as a full-time student keeps on hamper^{ing} activists and nonactivists from full involvement with political issues. Their lack of vested interests also would continue to deprive them of their bargaining power. Finally, their lack of first-hand information about government's policies also severely cut down their leadership role in pressure politics vis-a-vis the 'professionalized' pressure groups.

Consequently, student organizations, being inefficacious to steer themselves and influence the political restructuring, may recede to campuses and channel their energy into improving the rights and benefits for the students. Their political role may still be confined to waging protests when some blatant injustice happens in future.

B. Nonactivists

Put in shortly, the nonactivists' political inefficacy to understand and influence politics will only grow with the continuous politicization of Hong Kong. Thus, while the policy or political impacts are perceived as not directly threatening their own interests, they pay no attention to them. When the impacts touch on their interests too, it may very likely be wide-ranging policy or political arrangement. Their inefficacy about them will then hinder them from getting involved. With their waning nationalism, inefficacy, instrumental individualism and perception that China as a non-liberal and dishonest future master, our nonactivists will seek personal rather than collective solutions for 1997. They may either resign themselves to fates when staying in Hong Kong or actively grasp their passports for precaution.

All in all, from both a structural and dynamic point of view, we have little room to be sanguine of a resurgence of intense student activism in our run-up to 1997.

Appendix I

1. Psychological Involvement in Politics (Verba and Nie, 1972:368-9)

- a. How interested are you in politics and national affairs ? Are you very interested, somewhat interested, only slightly interested, not at all interested ?
- b. In general, how often do you usually discuss politics and national affairs with others-every day, maybe once or twice a week, less than once a week, or never ?
- c. How often do you usually discuss local community problems with others in this community-every day, at least once a week, less than once a week, less than once a week, or never ?
- d. Are there any magazines that you read regularly ? (if yes), Which ones are they ? (One point was given for each news magazine regularly read. News magazines were defined as those predominantly composed of politics and public affairs.
- e. How often do you watch the news broadcasts on TV-once a day, about a few times a week, about once a week, or never ?

- f. And how often do you read the newspaper-everyday, a few times a week about once a week, less than once a week, or never ?
- g. We are interested in how well known the community leaders are in different places. What is the name of the chairman of the District Board of this community (district) ? How about the names of those district board members representing your own constituency ?

2. Political Efficacy(Milbrath, 1977:157)

Three items of agreement-disagreement type questions are raised.

- 1. 'I don't think public officials care very much what people like me think.'
- 2. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
- 3. Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

Appendix II--- Approach (Research Method) of the Research

The advantages and biases of in-depth interview as a research method are discussed below so as to justify our adoption of it in our research. The main advantages of the method of in-depth and face-to-face interview are first listed (Bailey, 1982:182-183; Kidder & Judd, 1986:221-250):

1. Allowing Clarification and Further Probing:

For research topics which are newly conducted, clarification and deeper probing are of vital importance for producing fruitful and suggestive results. The dynamic or interactive element built in the interviewing process allows interviewer a large scope of flexibility to clear off any misunderstandings and drill deeper into the problem.

2. Complexity

For research topics involving relatively large complexity, a skilled and experienced interviewer can tactfully reduce the difficulties for respondents in answering by appropriate interviewing techniques. It is a great burden for respondents

answering a mailed questionnaire of enormous complexity full of skips, charts and graphs, arrows, detailed instructions and various other contingencies.

3. Control over Environment

'An interviewer can standardize the interview environment by making certain that the interview is conducted in privacy, that there is no noise, and so on, in contrast to a mailed study, where the questionnaires may be completed by different people under drastically different conditions.' (Bailey, 1982:182)

4. Spontaneity

The interactive and face-to-face element built in interview can record spontaneous answers, while mailed questionnaire cannot. Spontaneous answers may be more informative and less normative than answers about which respondents have time to ponder about.

Considering the aforementioned advantages, the method of face-to-face and in-depth interview is adopted here for a number of reasons. First, our research topic is entirely new in Hong Kong

contexts, thus, our imperative for clarification and deeper probing is preponderant. Second, the large complexity of our research, as illustrated in our framework, suggests that skilful interviewing may reduce the complexity for our respondents as compared with mailed questionnaire. Third, the spontaneous nature of interviewing can minimize the distortions made by our respondents, particularly when questions on their values are repeatedly raised in our research.

In addition, precautionary steps have been taken to minimize possible interview biases. First, the promises of anonymity are repeatedly delivered to our respondents during both the contacting and interviewing processes. Second, after interviewing for about every one hour, offers were stretched to respondents to have short breaks so as to avoid bad quality of answers out of their fatigue. Lastly, for 29 out of 30 respondents, the interviews were conducted in closed-door, quiet and disturbance-free environment. For the only one with whom the interview was conducted outdoors, no disturbance was present as it was a quiet and large open area. Thus, the concentration of our respondents on our research could be secured, and, as a corollary, the validity of their answers was promoted.

References

Abcarian, Gilbert & John W. Soule, Social Psychology & Political Behaviour, Charles Merrill Publication Co., Columbus, Ohio, 1971.

Alford, Robert.R., & Harry M. Scoble, "Sources of Local Political Involvement", American Political Science Review, 62:1192-1206, 1968.

Almond, G.A. & Powell, G.B., Jr., Comparative Politics, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978.

Almond, Gabriel Abraham & Sidney, Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, N.J.: 1966.

Altbach, Philip G., Student Politics in America: A Historical Analysis, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974.

Aristotle, The Politics, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984.

Bailey, K.D., Methods of Social Research, 2nd ed., The Free Press, New York, 1982.

Bell, Daniel, The Public Interest, 13, 1968, p.61-101.

Bell, Daniel, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976.

Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973.

Bellah, R.N. et. al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1985.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, & William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Bond, Michael H. (ed.), The Psychology of the Chinese People, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Campbell, Angus; Converse, Philip E.; Warren M. & Stokes, Donald, The American Voter, Wiley, New York, 1960.

Chan, Anita, Children of Mao, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985.

Chan, K.C., 'Student Movement in Hong Kong,' in Cheung, J.Y.S. ed., Hong Kong: In search of a Future, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984. (in Chinese)

Chan, K.K., The Culture of Hong Kong: A Myth or Reality? , in Hong Kong Society-A Reader, Kwan Y.H. & Chan K.K. ed., Hong Kong: Writers' & Publishers' Cooperative, 1986, pp. 209-230.

Chan, J.Y. and Chan, E., A Value Study of the Post-Secondary Students in Hong Kong, 1987. (Unpublished Paper)

Cheng, J.Y.S.(ed.), Hong Kong: In Search of a Future, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984.(in Chinese)

-----, "Pressure Groups and Hong Kong Politics", in Cheung (ed.), Essays on Hong Kong Economy, Politics, and Society, Hong Kong: Chin Sian, 1984, 127-137 (in Chinese).

Cheung, P.L., "The Development & Problems of the Student Movement in Hong Kong", The Chinese Monthly, May, 1987, pp.30-35.(in Chinese)

Cheung, T.S, "The Socially Malnourished Generation: An Anatomy of the Self-image of a Student Population in Hong Kong", in Lin, T.B.; Lee, Rance P.L. & Simons, U.E., (eds.), Hong Kong: Economic, Social and Political Studies in Development, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1979.

Ching, K.M., "The Characteristics of the Post-Secondary Education in Hong Kong", in A General Review of the Post-Secondary Education in Hong Kong, Student Union of the Baptist College ed., Hong Kong: King Ling, p. 16-22.(in Chinese)

Choi, C.Y. & Chan Y.K., "Housing Development and Housing Policy in Hong Kong", in Hong Kong: Economic, Social and Political Studies in Development, Lin, Lee and Simonis ed., New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1979, pp.183-202.

Chow, T.T, The May Fourth Movement, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Chow, W.S, "A Review of Social Policies in Hong Kong," in Kwan Y.H. & Chan K.K (ed), Hong Kong Society A Reader, Hong Kong: Writers' & Publishers' Cooperative, 1986, pp. 137-153.

Dahl, Robert A, Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

Davison, W.P.; Boylan, J. & Yu, F.T.C., Mass Media: System and Effect, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976.

Dean of Students' Affairs, New Asia College, A Value Survey of Freshmen of the New Asia College, April, 1987, (unpublished)

Dennis, Jack, "Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public", American Political Science Review, 64: 813-835.

Dipalma, Giuseppe, Apathy and Participation: Mass Politics in Western Societies, New York: Free Press, 1970.

Eckstein, Harry & Ted R. Gurr, Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975.

Eisenstadt, S.N., From Generation to Generation, New York, 1956.

Emmos, C.F., "Public Opinion and Political Participation in Pre-1997 Hong Kong", in Jao, Y.C. ed et. al. Hong Kong and 1997-Strategies for the Future, Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, 1985.

Endacott, G.B., Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1962, Hong Kong: H.K. University Press, 1964.

Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1956.

Gamson, William A., Power & Discontent, Dorsey Press, Homewood Ill, 1968.

Gibbons, D.S., "The Spectator Political Culture: A Refinement of the Almond and Verba Model," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, V.9, 1971.

Harris, Peter, Hong Kong: A Study in Breaucratic Politics, Hong Kong: Heineman Asia, 1978.

Ha Hei, Union Journal, 86, Hong Kong: Student Union, The University of Hong Kong, 1987.

Hodge, in Jones, John F, ed., The Common Welfare: Hong Kong's Social Services, Hong Kong: The Chinese Univeristy Press, 1981.

Ho, Y.P., "Hong Kong's Trade and Industry: Changing Patterns and Prospects", in Cheng, J.Y.S (ed.), Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, pp. 165-207, 1986.

Hoadley, J.S., "Hong Kong is the Life-boat: Notes on Political Culture and Socialization", Journal of Oriental Studies, 1870,8, 206-218.

-----, "Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese: Patterns and Trends", Asian Survey, 13(6), 604-616.

Hong Kong 1976, Report for the Year 1975

Hong Kong Federation of Students (ed.), Student Movement of Hong Kong in Retrospect, Hong Kong: Wide Angle, 1983 (in Chinese).

Hughes, Richard, Borrowed Place Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and its Many Faces, Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1976.

Huntington, Samuel P, "Generation, Cycle, and Their Role in American Development", in Samuel, R.J.(ed.), Political Generation and Political Development, Lexington, Mas: D.C. Heath, 1976.

Huntington, Samuel P., & Nelson, Joan M., No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries, Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1977.

Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, New Jerse: Pinceton University Press, 1977.

Inkeles, Alex, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries", American Political Science Review, 63:1120-1141, 1969.

Jarvie, J.C., "A Postscript on Riot and the Future of Hong Kong", in Jarvie (ed.), Hong Kong: A Society in Transition, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.

Jennings, M. Kent & Niemi, Richard G., Generation and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and

Their Parents, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Karabel, Jerome, & A.H. Halsey (ed.), Power & Ideology in Education, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Kenniston, K., Youth and Dissent: the Rise of a New Opposition, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971.

-----, Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1963.

Kidder, L.H., & Judd, C.M., Research Methods in Social Relations, fifth ed., CBS College Publishing, New York, 1986.

King, Y.C., 'The Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong, emphasis on the grassroots level.' Asian Survey 15,5(May): 422-39.

Kowloon Disturbances 1966, Report of Commission of Inquiry, Acting Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1967, pp. 128.

Klineberg, Otto; Zavalloni, Marisa; Louis-Guerin, Christine & BenBrika, Jeanne, Students, Values, and Politics, New York: The Free Press, 1979.

Kluckhohn, Florence R & Fred L. Strodbeck, Variations in Value Orientations, Row, Peterson & Co., Illinois, 1961.

Kuan, H.C., "Political Stability and Change in Hong Kong", in Lin, T.B. et. al. (ed.), Hong Kong: Economic, Social, & Political Studies in Development, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1979.

Kwan Y.H., "Social Welfare and Service in Hong Kong", in Kwan, Y.H. & Chan, K.K. (ed.), Hong Kong Society -- A Reader, Hong Kong: Writers' & Publishers' Cooperative, 1986, pp. 155-207.

Kwok, E.S.T., "From 'the Campaign for Chinese to be an Official Language' to the 'Second Chinese Language Campaign'", in Cheng, J.Y.S. (ed.), Hong Kong in the 1980s, Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern Publishers Ltd., pp. 32-44, 1982.

Lane, R.E., "Market & Politics: the Human Product", British Journal of Political Science, 11,1 (Jan) 1981: pp. 1-16.

-----, Political Ideology, Free Press, Glencoe, 1962.

Lau S., "The Value Orientations and Educational Process of the University Students in Hong Kong," in the Education Journal, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1986, Dec., 12, pp. 7-13.

Lau, S.K., Society and Politics in Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1981.

-----, "Social Change, Bureaucratic Rule and Emergent Political Issues in Hong Kong", World Politics, vol.xxxv, no.4, 1983.

-----, "Political Reform and Political Development in Hong Kong: Dilemmas and Choices", A paper presented to the Conference on Hong Kong and 1997: Strategies for the Future, organized by the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1984.

Lau, S.K. & Kuan, H.C., "The Changing Political Culture of the Hong Kong Chinese", Occasional Paper, Centre for Hong Kong Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985.

-----, "Hong Kong After the Sino-British Agreement: Limits to Institutional Change in a Dependent Polity", Occasional Paper, Centre for Hong Kong Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985.

Law, Y.P., 30-Year Review of Student Movements in Hong Kong, in The Chinese Monthly, Hong Kong, May, 1987, pp.35-37.

Lee, M.K., "New Situation of Internal Social Conflicts in Hong Kong in

(ed.), Hong Kong in the 80s: A Society in Transition, Hong Kong: University Publisher, 1982, pp. 39-55 (in Chinese).

-----, "The Decline of Intellect: the Social and Political Roles of Hong Kong Intellectuals", in Cheng (ed.), Essays on Hong Kong Economy, Politics, and Society, 1984, 223-227 (in Chinese).

-----, "Class Politics and Hong Kong's Future", in Cheng (ed.), Essay on Hong Kong Economy, Politics, and Society, 1984, 249-254.

Lee, Rance P.L.; Cheung T.S. & Cheung Y.W., Material and Non-Material Conditions and Life Satisfaction of Urban Residents in Hong Kong, in Lin, T.B.; Lee, Rance P.L. & Simons, U.E., (eds.), Hong Kong: Economic, Social and Political Studies in Development, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1979.

Lee, Rance P.L. ed. 1981, Corruption & Its Control in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.

Leung, F., 'Stories of A Small Case' in Ming Po Monthly, Sept., 1981.

Leung, H.C., "Political Action in Compressing Space: A Study of Political Activist Groups in Hong Kong," M.Phil Thesis, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1986.

Linton, R., The Cultural Background of Personality.

Lipset, S.M., The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind, New York: The Free Press. 1983.

-----, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, London: Heineman Educational Book Ltd, 1983.

----- (ed.), Student Politics, Basic Books, New York, 1967.

-----, Rebellion in the University, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972.

Lukes, Steven, Individualism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1973.

Macke, A., "Trends in Aggregate-Level Political Alienation." The Sociological Quarterly, 20,1 (Winter), 1979 : 77-87.

Manheim, Jaroe B., The Politics Within, London: Longman, 1982.

Marcuse, H., One-Dimensional Man, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969

_____, An essay on liberation, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

Marsella A.J., Deros, G & Hsu L.K. (ed.), Culture and Self: Asian & Western Perspective, New York: Tavistock Publication, 1985.

Merelman, R.M., "Democratic Politics & Cultural of American Education", American Political Science Review, 74 (Oct,1980): 319-331.

Milbrath, Lester W. & M.L. Goel, Political Participation, Chicago: Rand McNally College, 1977.

Miller, Arthur H., "Political Issues and Frustration in Government", American Political Science Review, (Sept. 1974),

Miners, N.J., The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Mok, T.K., "Hong Kong Youth Problem -- Analysis of Social System", in Hong Kong Social Workers' Chief Union (ed.), Hong Kong Youth: Problems and Services, (in Chinese).

Ng, M.Y., "Change in Peace: Ten Years of Hong Kong in Retrospect", The Seventies (121),1980, pp. 30-33 (in Chinese).

Ng, Pedro P.T., "Recent Trends in Work and Leisure in Hong Kong and Higher Education's Response", Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1986.

-----, "Socio-Demographic Patterns of Leisure Behavior of Adolescents in Hong Kong", Hong Kong: Institute of Social Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1984.

Ng, S.H., "Labour", in Cheng, J.Y.S (ed.), Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, pp. 268-299, 1986.

Nie, Norman H., G. Bingham Powell, Jr., & Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure & Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I & II", American Political Science Review, 63: 361-378, pp. 808-832, 1969.

Nie, Norman H., & Kristi A., Reader in Public Opinion & Mass Communication, The Free Press, 1981.

Office of Student Affairs, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Survey on Career Preferences, 1983-86.
Survey on the Career Aspirations of 1986 Graduates.
Survey on Starting Salaries of Graduates, 1982-86.

Office of Student Affairs, University of Hong Kong, A Profile of New Students, 1986.

Office of Student Affairs, Dialogue, March, 1987.

Parelius, A.P. & Parelius R.J., The Sociology of Education, Prentice-Hall, 1978.

Pierce J.C., & Pride R.A., Cross-National Mirco-Analysis, Vol. II, London: Sage Publication, 1972.

Putnam, Robert D., The Beliefs of Politicians, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973.

Pye L.W., Politics, Personality and Nation Building, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.

Rabushka, A., The Changing Face of Hong Kong: New Departure in Public Policy, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1973.

Riseman D., The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character, New York: Anchor Books, 1953.

Rokeach, Milton, The Open and Closed Mind, New York: Basic Books, 1960, pp.32-51.

Rosenberg, Morris., "The Meaning of Politics in Mass Society", Public Opinion Quarterly, p. 5-15, Spring, 1951.

Sampson, E.E., Student Activism and Protest, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1970.

Seligson, Mitchell A, & Booth, A. John (eds.), Political Participation in Latin America, Vol II: Politics and the Poor, London: Holmes & Meier Publisher Inc., 1979.

Shively S., Political Orientation in Hong Kong - A Socio-psychological Approach, Social Research

Centre, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1972.

Shils, Edward, Tradition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Soares, G.A.D, "The Active Few: Student Ideology and Participation in Developing Countries", in Student Politics, Lipset, S.M. ed, New York: Basic Books, 1967.

Sung, Y.W., "Fiscal and Economic Policies in Hong Kong", in Cheng, J.Y.S (ed.), Hong Kong in Transition, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, pp. 120-141, 1986.

Torney, Judith V.; A.N. Oppenheim & Russell Farness, Civic Education in Ten Countries, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1975.

The Society of the Social Science Faculty, the University of Hong Kong, Political Participation in Hong Kong, 1984 (in Chinese).

The Society of the Social Science Faculty, the University of Hong Kong, Civic Consciousness among the Hong Kong Post-Secondary Students, 1986. (in Chinese)

Tsang, W.K., "The Political Development in Hong Kong & the Civic Education," in the Quarterly of the Hong Kong Council of Social Services, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Council of Social Services, 1985, Summer, vol. 93, pp. 2-10. (in Chinese)

Verba, Sidney & Norman Nie, Participation in America, Harper & Row, New York, 1972.

----- (ed.), The Citizen & Politics: A Critical Perspective, Stanford: Greyloids Publishers, 1978.

Verba, Sidney; Norman Nie & J.O. Kim. Participation & Political Equality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Verba, Sidney & Lucian, W. Pye (eds.), The Citizens and Politics: A Comparative Perspective, Stanford: Greyloids Publishers, 1975.

Watts, Mercedith W., "Efficacy, Trust & Commitment to the Political Process", Social Science Quarterly,

Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. P623-631, 1973.

Wong, Aline, K., "Political Apathy and the Political System in Hong Kong", United College Journal, 8:1-20, 1970-71.

Wong, J.K.H., "Seperatism and Convergence -- Pattern of Administrative Adaptation in the New Territories", in Cheng, J.Y.S. (ed.), Hong Kong in the 1980s, Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern Publishers Ltd., pp. 13-22, 1982.

Yang, "Student Political Activism", Youth and Society, Sept., pp. 45-57, 1973.

Yeung, S., Social Policy and Social Movement, Hong Kong: Wide Angle, 1983. (in Chinese)

Youngson, A.J., Hong Kong: Economic Growth and Policy, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1982.



000484539